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i 
A proposed Bilateral Arbitration Treaty would subject 
international commercial disputes between enterprises 
in signatory states’ jurisdictions to arbitration unless 
the parties agreed to the contrary. This marks a 
substantial departure from conventional 
understandings of arbitration as based on the consent 
of the parties. More importantly, the policy would 
modify the jurisdiction of the courts, removing a large 
number of disputes to offshore tribunals subject to 
minimal judicial oversight. This paper explores the 
constitutional propriety of such a policy, with 
particular attention paid to the principles of the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, public provision 
of essential State functions, open justice, and 
democracy. These constitutional principles would be 
subverted if the policy were to operate within the 
existing regulatory framework for arbitration. The 
paper makes recommendations for possible 
modifications to the policy that would make it a better 
fit with the constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper, excluding bibliography, non-substantive 
footnotes, appendices, table of contents, and abstract, 
comprises approximately 17,640 words.  
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For if we would judge ourselves, we 
should not be judged.1 
 
The first impulse of a rudimentary 
soul is to do justice by his own hand. 
Only at the cost of mighty historical 
efforts has it been possible to 
supplant in the human soul the idea 
of justice entrusted to authorities.2  
 
I Introduction 
1 In recent speeches international arbitration expert Gary Born 
proposed bilateral arbitration treaties (“BATs”)—arrangements 
between states that would establish a default regime whereby 
commercial contracts between parties of each State would by 
default be submitted to arbitration.3 International commercial 
arbitration is not a new phenomenon, and nor is pro-arbitration 
State policy.4 What is novel about the BAT is the expansive 
abandonment of State sovereignty in favour of private 
organisations, and the departure from the principle that 
arbitration is based on express consent.5 
2 The usefulness and legality of a BAT in New Zealand has been 
the subject of recent commentary.6 Ideally, the BAT would 
work to reduce transaction costs by alleviating concerns 
enterprises might have about undertaking trade in foreign 
jurisdictions. Disputes arising from international transactions 
                                                   
1 1 Corinthians 11:31, Authorised (King James) Version.   
2 Eduardo J Couture “The Nature of the Judicial Process” (1950) 25 Tulane 
Law Review 1 at 7. 
3 See, for the text of the speech, Gary Born “BITs, BATs and Buts: 
Reflections on International Dispute Resolution” (2014) 13 YAR.  
4 See Gary Born International Commercial Arbitration: Volume I (2nd ed, 
Kluwer International Law, 2014) at 1326; William W Park Arbitration of 
International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice (2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2012) at 215; Mitsubishi Motors Corp 
v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc 473 US 614 (1985); Fiona Trust & Holding 
Corp v Privalov [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 891. 
5 See generally Andrea Marco Steingruber Consent in International 
Arbitration (Oxford University Press, New York, 2012). 
6 Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice 
for Small and Medium Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration 
Treaty” (2014) NZJPIL (forthcoming).  
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can be exceptionally expensive and time-consuming to resolve 
due to the layering of counsel across jurisdictions and the need 
for specialist advice.7 It is possible, then, that the BAT would 
reduce the costs of disputes that emerge where the parties have 
omitted to opt for arbitration in circumstances where it would 
have been efficient for them to have done so. Born argues:8 
If you provide a more effective means of dispute 
resolution for international transactions you will 
get more international transactions. 
3 This paper, however, focusses on the constitutional 
significance of a regime that, by default, places international 
commercial disputes outside the reach of the State courts. 
While this paper principally concerns the New Zealand 
constitution, it draws on international materials and seeks to 
illustrate more general points common to many domestic legal 
systems. 
4 In Part II the paper provides an overview of the provisions and 
general effect of the BAT. To introduce the way this paper uses 
the concept of ‘constitutionality’, Part III develops a definition 
of the term, explains the paper’s methodology, and introduces 
some broad constitutional principles.  
5 The balance of the paper develops these constitutional 
principles and measures the BAT against them. Part IV 
examines the BAT in light of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (BORA), concluding that, while the BAT is not 
unjustifiably inconsistent with the BORA, the Act might speak 
to broader constitutional principles that are nonetheless salient. 
The principle of the separation of powers is discussed in Part 
V, which concludes that the BAT is a significant interference 
with the judiciary’s traditional domain and the institutional 
balance of State powers which is the purpose of that principle. 
Part VI considers whether the BAT is consistent with the 
principle of the rule of law, and in Part VII it is argued that the 
BAT amounts to an unconstitutional privatisation of a core 
State function—the administration of justice. Finally, Part VIII 
                                                   
7 Butler and Herbert, above n 6, (forthcoming).  
8 Tom Moore “Born’s BAT gets set to fly” (2 January 2014) Commercial 
Dispute Resolution News <www.cdr-news.com>. 
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suggests that the BAT may be inconsistent with New Zealand’s 
central constitutional principle: representative democracy.  
6 Genn observed that the role of the civil justice system 
“provides the legal structure for the economy to operate 
effectively and for the power of government to be scrutinised 
and limited.”9 It will be argued that the BAT makes a tension 
of these two ends. Its purpose is to improve economic 
efficiency, but it achieves that at the expense of thorough 
scrutiny of government action. For that reason, it may not be 
constitutional. 
II Overview of the BAT 
7 This part examines the effect that the BAT purports to have, 
and the legal mechanisms by which those effects would be 
achieved. This is of significance to the question of the 
constitutionality of the BAT because the institutions 
responsible for its effect, and the means by which it takes 
effect, will be important to understanding its constitutional 
import. 
8 The BAT can be conceived of as either being a form of sui 
generis State-mandated dispute resolution, or as a form of 
international commercial arbitration.10 In the former case, the 
BAT, and the legal structure it creates, can be seen as the State 
establishing the arbitral tribunal as a court or a decision-maker, 
in the same way that it has done in relation to other disputes.11 
Accordingly, the power of the tribunal when it is established 
for a BAT arbitration flows from the power of the State.12 
Under the alternative conception, the State may be more simply 
creating a standard implied term in international commercial 
contracts. 
                                                   
9 Hazel Genn Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010) at 16. 
10 See Butler and Herbert, above n 6, (forthcoming). 
11 The High Court is, roughly speaking, the only court of inherent 
jurisdiction. All others exercise statutory jurisdiction. See further below at 
[114]. 
12 In this respect, the theoretical underpinning of BAT arbitration would 
diverge from received understandings of the juridical rationale for the 
authority of arbitral tribunals. See generally Emmanuel Gaillard Legal 
Theory of International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Netherlands, 2010). 
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9 Determining which conception best accords with the character 
of the BAT is significant for its interaction with the 
constitution. In some sense, though, each conception is in 
substance the establishment of private tribunals as the default 
mechanism for the resolution of particular disputes. The 
difference would really lie only in the terms with which we 
would describe the legal effect of the BAT, be it those of public 
or private law; the arrangement of the courts, or the default 
terms of commercial contracts.  
10 Whether a mechanism of dispute resolution can properly be 
termed arbitration depends on the presence of features 
characteristic of arbitration.13 The BAT is, in the author’s view, 
best understood as a State-established form of dispute 
resolution that seeks to use the existing mechanism of 
international commercial arbitration.  
11 The language of the BAT suggests, though, the view that the 
form of dispute resolution is in fact arbitration. The process is 
described as arbitration throughout, and the BAT seeks to 
harness the existing mechanisms that facilitate arbitration, such 
as the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The effect, 
however, is to grant what appears to be an arbitral tribunal the 
powers otherwise reserved to State courts exercising 
jurisdiction by sovereign right. Accordingly, this paper will use 
the language of public and constitutional law to analyse the 
BAT.14 
12 This sub-part provides an overview of how the BAT would 
function, so far as is relevant to assessing its constitutional 
compliance. This assessment is based on the draft BAT 
produced by Gary Born.15  
                                                   
13 David A R Williams and Amokura Kawharu Williams & Kawharu on 
Arbitration (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at 4. 
14 An analysis of the BAT from a private law perspective would, though, be 
fruitful. Possible areas of further enquiry are the consistency of the implied 
term conception of the BAT with principles of contract law. See on that 
topic generally Randy E Barnett “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and 
Contractual Consent” (1992) 78 Virginia Law Review 886. 
15 See appended copy.  
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A Functional effect of the BAT 
1 General provisions 
13 The BAT would be a treaty between two States. Legal persons 
organised for profit in each jurisdiction would be “enterprises” 
for the purposes of the treaty.16 A controversy between 
enterprises in relevant jurisdictions arising out of inter alia a 
commercial contract would be designated an “International 
Commercial Dispute”.17 Where an International Commercial 
Dispute exists between parties, by service of notice one party 
may propose good faith discussions to be concluded within 30 
days.18 If the period concludes without amicable resolution, the 
party may issue a notice of arbitration and refer the dispute to 
arbitration.19 The effect is, or purports to be, the same as that of 
an arbitration agreement to which the parties expressly 
consented. 
14 Parties would be free to opt-out of the default regime by 
selecting an alternative arbitration procedure,20 choosing a 
State-based forum or an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism such as expert determination,21 or by simple 
agreement that the BAT would not be applicable to the 
contract.22 
15 If the contract did not by express writing do one of the above, 
the contract would be subject to the default provisions of the 
BAT.23 The default mechanism would provide for matters that 
would ordinarily be the features of an arbitration agreement. 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration is to appoint arbitrators, 
                                                   
16 Draft BAT, art 1. 
17 Draft BAT, art 1. Note that the Draft BAT excludes from the definition of 
an International Commercial Dispute consumer disputes, employment or 
labor disputes, domestic relations disputes, marital or child custody disputes, 
and inheritance disputes. State parties could further tailor that list to comport 
with their public policy positions on what matters ought not to be arbitrable 
(or, not, at least, without positive consent).  
18 Draft BAT, art 2(1)(a). 
19 Draft BAT, art 2(1)(b). 
20 Draft BAT, art 5(1)(b). 
21 Draft BAT, art 5(1)(c) and (d). 
22 Draft BAT, art 5(1)(a). 
23 Draft BAT, art 4(1). 
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and the arbitration is to be subject to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.24 
2 Role of State courts 
16 Courts in the States party to the treaty would be obliged, where 
there existed an International Commercial Dispute, to refer the 
parties to arbitration, upon request of one of the parties.25 
Where a court finds a binding arbitration agreement, there 
exists a duty not to litigate. That duty is given effect by Art 8 of 
the Model Law, or art 8, sch 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
each of which oblige courts to stay litigation in breach of an 
arbitration agreement.26 Where a party seeks litigation in a 
foreign jurisdiction in breach of the arbitration agreement, an 
anti-suit injunction may be available.27 
3 Status of awards 
17 The BAT purports to designate awards made by tribunals 
operating under a jurisdiction born of the treaty as “awards.”28 
It achieves this by indicating the “mutual desire and 
expectation” of the State parties to the BAT that awards made 
under it are enforceable under the New York Convention, and 
that the provisions of the BAT be “deemed to constitute a valid 
agreement to arbitrate” between the relevant enterprises subject 
to the BAT.29  
18 This is significant, in that in foreshadows a possible reluctance 
on part of some State courts to enforce arbitral awards in 
absence of consent to arbitration, notwithstanding ‘pro-
arbitration’ interpretative presumptions.30 
                                                   
24 Draft BAT, art 4(1). 
25 Draft BAT, art 3(1). The use of the term request suggests that with 
acquiescence of both parties, a dispute could be determined in a State court, 
notwithstanding its status as an International Commercial Dispute for the 
purposes of the BAT.  
26 Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at 96. 
27 Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at 78. See also concerning general 
jurisdiction to regulate proceedings in relation to arbitration Carter Holt 
Harvey Ltd v Genesis Power Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 794 (HC) at [61]. 
28 Draft BAT, art 6. 
29 Draft BAT, art 6(4). 
30 See, concerning this interpretative approach, See Born International 
Commercial Arbitration: Volume I, above n 4,  at 1326; Park, above n 4, at 
215; Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc 473 US 614 
7 
 
4 Confidentiality 
19 Arbitrations under the BAT will be entirely confidential unless 
the parties expressly in writing agree otherwise. Parties would 
be required to keep confidential “all materials submitted in or 
created for the purpose of the arbitration, all documents 
produced by another party in the arbitration not otherwise in 
the public domain, and all awards, orders and other 
communications in the arbitration”.31 The provision allows an 
exception, though, where disclosure is necessary for 
proceedings in court related to, for example, the enforcement of 
an award.  
20 It would of course be open to the State parties to modify the 
BAT to suit their needs, and remove the confidentiality 
provision. It is not an essential feature of the scheme, but rather 
reflects the general practice of confidentiality in international 
arbitration.32 This paper proceeds on the basis that State parties 
would adopt the BAT from the draft as it stands, but 
acknowledges that some of the criticisms leveled at the BAT 
could be mitigated with minor modifications. Confidentiality is 
one of these areas.33 
B Conformity with New Zealand arbitration law 
21 The BAT is designed to fit in with the existing legislation that 
enables the operation of arbitration. In New Zealand, the 
relevant legislation is the local enactment of the Model Law, 
that being the Arbitration Act 1996. The Act provides a 
definition of an arbitration agreement:34 
… an agreement by the parties to submit to 
arbitration all or certain dispute which have arisen 
or which may arise between them in respect of a 
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or 
not ... 
                                                                                                            
(1985); Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 
891. 
31 Draft BAT, art 4(2). 
32 Gary Born International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2009) at 87. 
33 See below at Part VIII. 
34 Arbitration Act 1996, s 2. 
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22 The law accordingly requires consent to arbitration. Consent is 
generally found in the form of the arbitration agreement,35 
except inter alia in cases where non-signatories are bound by 
the agreement.36  
23 Some other dispute resolution mechanisms referred to as 
“arbitration” may lack a consensual basis. Compulsory 
schemes of industrial arbitration have historically existed in 
New Zealand, and continue to operate in Australia.37 Similarly, 
it has been suggested that investor-State dispute resolution is an 
example of non-consensual arbitration for the reason that there 
is no privity between the relevant State and investor.38 This is 
not, however, the case: consent is manifested in these 
circumstances in the State’s standing offer to arbitrate.39  
24 The Law Commission has observed that statutorily imposed 
arbitration may have real practical benefit, even in absence of 
an agreement to arbitrate.40 Accordingly, s 9 of the Arbitration 
Act 1996 allows that Act to yield to another where there exists 
an inconsistency. 
25 Indeed, the Law Commission recommended that the High 
Court Rules be amended to allow for the Court to refer a 
dispute to a referee,41 despite the inclusion of court-ordered 
arbitration being rejected from inclusion in the Arbitration Act 
1996 on the grounds that it was inappropriate for a scheme 
based on consent.42 
26 The centrality of consent to the statutory language would 
require that domestic law be modified to accommodate the 
BAT. 
                                                   
35 Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at 4. 
36 See generally, Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at [4.7].  
37 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973, and the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1977, and Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth). See Butler and Herbert, above n 6, (forthcoming).  
38 This argument features in Butler and Herbert, above n 6, (forthcoming).  
39 Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at 15. Written consent is said to exist 
in the form of the treaty: Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and 
Matthew Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: Substantive 
Principles (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at [3.28] and [4.60]. See 
also Jan Paulsson The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013) at 53.  
40 Law Commission Arbitration (NZLC R20, 1991) at [115]. 
41 At [109]-[110]. 
42 Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at 16. 
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C Opportunities for review  
27 This section sets out the legal framework for review of arbitral 
awards.43 The basis for review of an arbitral awards in New 
Zealand is now in conformity with the scope of review under 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”).44 The 
grounds of the New York Convention are codified in the 
Arbtration Act 1996.45 
28 The Arbitration Act 1996 further provides for appeals on 
matters of law. But, for those provisions to apply, parties 
subject to an international arbitration must expressly contract to 
that effect.46 Accordingly, it is not conceivable that such review 
will be available subsequent to BAT arbitration, unless it is the 
case that the parties, by consent, opt to modify the default 
operation of the BAT.47 
D Summary 
29 While the BAT purports to refer disputes to arbitration, it is, in 
the author’s view, better characterised as a system of State-
established private dispute resolution which uses the 
mechanism of arbitration to administer justice. This 
characterisation provides, then, a starting point for addressing 
the central concern of this paper: is such a system 
constitutional? 
III What is meant by “constitutionality” 
30 For the purposes of this paper, it is necessary to briefly 
examine the meaning of the phrase “constitutional” in the New 
Zealand context. This part will examine the definition of 
constitutional law, the methodology adopted for identifying 
                                                   
43 The scope of review is addressed in more detail below at [56] et seq. 
44 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 330 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 
7 June 1959). Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at 40 and 467. 
45 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 2 cl 5(8), and sch 1 art 34(3) and (4). I use 
review to encompass both the setting aside of an award at the seat, and the 
process by which the enforcement of an award is challenged.  
46 Arbitration Act 1996, s 6 and sch 2, cl 5. See Williams and Kawharu, 
above n 13, at 43. 
47 This appears to be permitted by the Draft BAT: see art 5(3). 
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New Zealand’s constitution, and provide a brief overview of 
core constitutional principles which will be the subject of more 
detailed treatment in later parts.  
31 A constitutional law is one that pertains to the “distribution and 
allocation of public authority”.48 Or, as Edlin would have it, a 
matter is constitutional where it involves:49 
substantive feature of government authority—
expressed in terms of the institutional allocation 
of authority or the articulation of fundamental 
rights and liberties—and a possible modification, 
disruption or abrogation of fundamental rights or 
institutional authorities. 
32 Definitions aside, determining quite what amounts to a 
constitutional law, convention or principle presents some 
difficulty. Elias CJ observed that the constitution is a “subject 
in constant motion”, and “not easily explained.”50  
33 The locations of constitutional law are many: statutes, common 
law, the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives, Te 
Tiriti o Waitangi, the Cabinet Manual, the practice of public 
office holders, et cetera.51 Properly extra-legal sources, such as 
political philosophy, may also be influential.52 The difficult to 
describe “constitutional culture built on shared principles” also 
affects the observance and development of the constitution and 
must feature in an analysis of what is constitutional.53  
34 Accordingly, in attempting to discern the shape of the New 
Zealand constitution, this paper relies on a range of sources, 
none of which is authoritative. I adopt an approach based on 
the science of law as articulated by HLA Hart in The Concept 
of Law. Briefly, what is law is to be determined by the rule of 
                                                   
48 S E Finer, Vernon Bogdanor and Bernard Rudden Comparing 
Constitutions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) at 85. 
49 Douglas E Edlin “A Constitutional Right to Judicial Review: Access to 
Courts and Ouster Clauses in England and the United States” (2009) 57 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 67 at 73. See similarly Cabinet 
Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at “Introduction”. 
50 Sian Elias “Fundamentals: A Constitutional Conversation” (2011) 19 
Waikato Law Review: Taumauri 1 at 1. 
51 See generally Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in 
New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at ch 2. 
52 Elias, above n 50,  at 5. 
53 At 6. See generally Matthew Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional 
Culture” (2007) 22 NZULR 565. 
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recognition in a particular legal system.54 The practice that 
constitutes the rule of recognition is that of senior legal 
officials.55  Their conduct and consensus reveals whether a 
particular rule amounts to a law, convention, or principle. 
Canvassing a range of expressions of opinion on part of 
different constitutional actors should provide a rough sense of 
the constitutional implications of the BAT. There are, however, 
limitations to this methodology.  
35 A particular challenge in describing the constitution is that it in 
part relies on the concept of a “collaborative enterprise” of 
reciprocity between the branches of government.56 This 
relationship is sometimes termed ‘comity’. This mode of 
constitutional development relies on dialogue between 
constitutional actors, which necessarily takes place over a 
period of time. The answer to what is constitutional, then, can 
sometimes only emerge when the particular issue is raised. The 
constitution is in ‘constant motion’. We can predict what 
constitutional actors will consider within the bounds of what is 
constitutional, but it will be speculative. 
36 Most cynically, a realist criticism would argue that the New 
Zealand constitution—and perhaps any constitution57—is really 
a matter of “what happens” over time.58 But the normative 
content of this paper, and the sources on which it relies, is still 
of use even accepting ardent realism. ‘What happens’ is a result 
of the actions of constitutional actors; actions which are 
constrained by the constitution so far as the relevant actor 
considers itself bound by a particular norm. Accordingly, 
Palmer contends that the “symbolic and normative power of a 
constitution derives from the continued adherence to its 
                                                   
54 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) 
at 92-120. 
55 At 104. 
56 Joseph, above n 51, at 2, see further at 574, fn 459. 
57 John Priestley “Chipping Away at the Judicial Arm?” (2009) 17 Waikato 
Law Review: Taumauri 1 at 7. 
58 Peter Hennessy Cabinet (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) at 80, cited in 
Matthew Palmer “Legislative Constitutionalism Ascendant? Who Interprets 
an Unwritten Constitution in New Zealand?” (paper presented to 
Conference on Legislatures and Constitutionalism: The Role of Legislatures 
in the Constitutional State, Centre for Constitutional Studies,  Alberta, July 
2004). 
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evolving content by those it governs.”59 So we are back where 
we started: what are those norms, and what is the normative 
hold they have over constitutional actors? 
37 Assessing the constitutionality of the BAT presents unique 
difficulties. The policy is, in the author’s view, novel and not 
easily compared to other policies in New Zealand history.60 
Accordingly, the already murky waters of constitutional law 
become even more opaque where the BAT is concerned—no 
extant expressions of opinion on constitutional law will directly 
confront the issues the BAT presents. As a consequence, this 
paper must at times work by way of analogy, a challenging 
mode of reasoning in the best of situations, and one that is 
more difficult here because the role of the judiciary is under-
theorised in New Zealand scholarship.61 For this reason, some 
sources are quoted at length. The author must rely on his own 
sense of the meaning of the various sources, extrapolating from 
their general terms more specific meanings that will be useful 
for assessing the BAT. But, given the contentious nature of the 
subject matter, he wishes to afford the reader the opportunity to 
see for him or herself whether the sources support the author’s 
thesis.   
38 This paper concerns what will be done about the BAT, as well 
as what ought to be done about a BAT from a constitutional 
perspective. The next questions, then, are what is the content of 
the constitution (the is), and what should we do when faced 
with a policy that challenges the content of the constitution (the 
ought).  
                                                   
59 Matthew Palmer “Legislative Constitutionalism Ascendant? Who 
Interprets an Unwritten Constitution in New Zealand?” (paper presented to 
Conference on Legislatures and Constitutionalism: The Role of Legislatures 
in the Constitutional State, Centre for Constitutional Studies,  Alberta, July 
2004). 
60 But see Law Commission, above n 40, at ch 10. Those examples, 
however, involved much greater judicial supervision and control than the 
BAT affords.  
61 Or, as Palmer expresses the same sentiment, there may be a concern 
“about how deeply [the public’s] acceptance and respect [for the judiciary] 
is rooted in our constitutional culture”: Matthew Palmer “The Place of the 
Judiciary in the Constitutional Culture of New Zealand” (Paper presented to 
the Symposium on Australasian Constitutionalism, Centre for Comparative 
Constitutional Studies, University of Melbourne Law School, December 
2013) at 1. See,  concerning the absence of discussion of courts in positivist 
jurisprudence, Jeremy Waldron “The Concept and the Rule of Law” 
(Working Paper No. 08-50, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, New York University School of Law) at 20. 
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A The ‘is’ of the constitution 
39 The starting point for assessing the constitutionality of the BAT 
is to determine the content of the constitution. It hardly bears 
repetition, but New Zealand has no supreme law62 and 
Parliament has plenary power to make law.63 But beneath those 
basic observations, there are more sophisticated structures. The 
constitutional principles that this paper will focus on are the 
separation of powers,64 the rule of law,65 and representative 
democracy.66  
40 Some of these principles are more central to the constitution 
than others. Or, in other words, the polity has a preference for 
particular approaches to defining and regulating State power. 
So, for example, Palmer points out that the solution to 
discontent with the power of the legislature under the first-past-
the-post electoral system was “found in the primary 
constitutional norm – representative democracy – rather than 
the US style separation of powers by placing trust in the 
independent, and unelected, judiciary.”67 That is, a preference 
for reliance on representative democracy, rather than the rule of 
law and separation of powers. Simiarly, the public has 
generally not supported moves to increase the power of the 
judiciary relative to the legislature.68  
41 So the constitutional principles discussed will bear more or less 
on the BAT—or any other policy decision—according to their 
importance. While that might at first seem prosaic, it is an 
important observation. Not all of the issues discussed in the 
paper are of equivalent weight—the strength of particular 
principles wax and wane over time.  
                                                   
62 Consider New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
63 See Supreme Court Act 2003, s 3(2), which reads: “Nothing in this Act 
affects New Zealand’s continuing commitment to the rule of law and the 
sovereignty of Parliament.” See also Constitution Act 1986, s15(1), which 
reads: “The Parliament of New Zealand continues to have full power to 
make laws.”  
64 Joseph, above n 51, at [1.6.4]. 
65 At ch 7. 
66 At [1.6.2] and ch 8. 
67 Palmer, above n 61, at 8. 
68 At 23. 
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B The ‘ought’ of the constitution 
42 With a constitution as flexible as New Zealand’s, departure 
from the rules can prompt one of two outcomes. The country 
could experience a constitutional crisis, or the constitution 
could change to reflect the incorporation of the circumstances 
into the constitution. The former is not a necessary prerequisite 
for the latter—the constitution may change without crisis.69 But 
the former is likely to bring about the latter. Crisis or change 
may come about when one constitutional actor asserts a 
particular power and other constitutional actors either object or 
tolerate the assertion.70 
43 The constitutional actors that would be responsible for 
implementing the BAT would be the executive and Parliament. 
It would be an international agreement between New Zealand 
and another State. In New Zealand, international agreements 
are a product of joint executive and legislative action.71 These 
actors have a central role in creating and enforcing 
constitutional rules, particularly so because the executive and 
Parliament are far and away the more powerful branches of 
government, and the judicial “the junior and least powerful of 
the working parts of the constitution.”72  
44 The case this paper makes is, then, directed at legislators and 
policy makers. And when it proposes that a particular thing is 
constitutional, or unconstitutional, what is really being said is 
this: “for the reason of the constitution, you should(n’t) pursue 
this policy.” The claim is as political as it is legal in that the 
constitutional law concerns the allocation of political authority.  
45 The reason that such actors should pay attention to these kind 
of arguments is that, in broad terms, “those who [are] in a 
position to modify the law have a responsibility to arrive at a 
sound view about what makes a legal change a good change or 
                                                   
69 See, for some illustrative examples, Palmer, above n 53, at 593. 
70 Consider Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 (SC). 
71 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s 
Constitution and Government (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
2004) at 357; Joseph, above n 51, at [11.7.6]. 
72 Elias, above n 50, at 8. 
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a bad change.”73 Any derogation from a constitutional principle 
such as the rule of law “calls for close consideration and clear 
justification.”74 More specifically, when it comes to developing 
policy, or legislating, the legislature ought to pay attention to: 75 
not just … the particular measure under 
consideration but also to the way in which that 
measure will affect the broad impact of the legal 
system on the interests and rights of citizens. 
46 Palmer suggests that one of the drawbacks of the ‘unwritten’ 
constitution is that “it is easier for those elements to change, 
and for some groups of people to consciously change them, 
without serious public discussion, or even awareness, that a 
change is contemplated.”76 The need for careful consideration 
of the effect of a policy as radical as the BAT is all the more 
acute, then, in the New Zealand context.  
IV Compatibility with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 
47 The BORA applies to acts of the “legislative, executive, or 
judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand”, as well 
as “any person or body in the performance of any public 
function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or 
body by or pursuant to law.”77 
48 The BORA would be engaged by the BAT in three main ways. 
Firstly, it would control the legislative decision to enact 
legislation to implement the treaty in that it contains a direction 
“to those enacting or prescribing limits” to not unjustifiably 
infringe the protected rights.78 It would also apply to the 
interpretative actions of the courts when determining, for 
example, whether awards made under non-consensual 
arbitration pursuant to the BAT were properly within the 
meaning of “award” for the purposes of the existing 
                                                   
73 Jeremy Waldron “Principles of Legislation” in Richard W Bauman and 
Tsvi Kahana (eds) The Least Examined Branch: The Role of the Legislature 
in the Constitutional State (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 15 at 23. 
74 Lord Bingham “The Rule of Law” (2007) 66 CLJ 67 at 69. 
75 Waldron, above n 73, at 24. 
76 Palmer, above in 53, at 593. 
77 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3. 
78 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [15], per Elias CJ. 
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enforcement regime, or indeed in any relevant interpretation.79 
Finally, it may have implications for the operation of the 
arbitral tribunal itself, so far as it can be characterised as 
performing a “public function, power, or duty” that has been 
“conferred … on … [it] by or pursuant to law.”80 
49 The rights and freedoms guaranteed in the BORA apply to 
juridical as well as natural persons, so far as practicable.81 The 
BAT applies, per art 1 of the draft, to “enterprises” where an 
enterprise is a “legal or juridical entity constituted or organized 
for profit.” Accordingly, so far as the BAT places limitations 
on the rights of enterprises, BORA is engaged. 
A Natural justice 
50 The BAT, by requiring parties to go to arbitration, intends to 
circumscribe access to the courts. This presents a potential 
infringement of s 27(1) of the BORA, which guarantees the 
observance of principles of natural justice: 
27 Right to justice 
(1) Every person has the right to the observance 
of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal 
or other public authority which has the power to 
make a determination in respect of that person's 
rights, obligations, or interests protected or 
recognised by law. 
… 
51 An arbitral tribunal pursuant to the BAT would constitute a 
“tribunal” within the meaning of s 27. Case law indicates that 
the word ‘tribunal’ requires a broad interpretation,82 and that 
‘determination’ has an “adjudicative sense”.83 This 
interpretation is consistent with the case law of the United 
                                                   
79 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A 
Commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at [5.6.5]. 
80 See further below at [107] et seq. 
81 Section 29. See generally Butler and Butler, above n 79, at [5.11]. 
82 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) at 278. See also 
Paul Rishworth et al The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 2003) at 754, 755; Taito v R [2003] 3 NZLR 577 (PC) at 
[20]. 
83 Chisholm v Auckland City Council (CA 32/02, 29 November 2002); 
Butler and Butler, above n 79, at [25.2.19]. 
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Kingdom that found an arbitration to have quasi-judicial 
functions.84 
52 The meaning of natural justice has “not been the subject of any 
sustained judicial analysis.”85 The courts have found violations 
of natural justices where: a party was not allowed the 
opportunity to appear;86  a party was not adequately notified of 
elements of the proceedings;87 there were substantial delays in 
making a determination.88 The strictness of natural justice 
requirements are concomitant with the significance of the 
decision at hand.89 
53 Importantly for the compliance of the BAT and attendant 
procedural rules, the view that the concept of natural justice in 
s 27 goes beyond procedural guarantees and protects 
substantive interests has not taken hold.90 Natural justice is 
focussed on procedure and process.91 
54 The procedural controls provided by the BAT are compliant 
with the requirements of natural justice.92 There is no apparent 
infringement of BORA in this respect. This should not, though, 
be surprising. Institutional arbitration rules operative in a 
competitive environment and to secure participation from 
                                                   
84 Jivraj v Hashwani  [2011] WLR 1872; [2011] UKSC 40 (SC) at [41] per 
Clarke LJ. 
85 Butler and Butler, above n 79, at [25.2.4]. 
86 Matthews v Marlborough District Council [2000] NZRMA 451 (HC) 
(substantial costs fixed without opportunity for submissions from 
unsuccessful party); Pomeroy v Police [2000] NZAR 273, (1999) 5 HRNZ 
405 (HC) (defendant unable to access court due to disability). 
87 Police v Sharmly (No 1) [1999] DCR 1186 (DC) (failure to notify accused 
of evidence in time to prepare defence); Lal v Removal Review Authority 
HC Wellington AP95/92, 10 March 1994 (failure to inform applicant of 
important omission in application).  
88 Unitech University of Technology v Attorney-General HC Wellington 
CIV 2005-485-89, 7 July 2005 (two year delay in processing application for 
accreditation as a university). 
89 Ali v Deportation Review Tribunal [1997] NZAR 208 (HC) at 220 per 
Elias J; Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White 
Paper” [1984–1985] I AJHR A6 at [10.168]. 
90 Westco Lagan v Attorney-General [2001] 1 NZLR 40 (HC) at [60]-[61]. 
91 Butler and Butler, above n 79, at [25.2.14]. See further Ministry of Justice 
The Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Guide to the 
Rights and Freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act for the Public Sector 
<www.justice.govt.nz> at s 27. 
92 See Butler and Herbert, above n 6, (forthcoming).  
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consenting commercial parties must be able to at least appear 
to provide for natural justice.93 
55 In any event, for a party based in New Zealand that is having 
an award enforced against it, a breach of natural justice is an 
explicit grounds on which a court may refuse to enforce an 
award.94 The courts have observed in respect of domestic 
arbitration that it is a procedure with “enforceable standards of 
natural justice,”95 and the courts may refuse to enforce an 
award on those grounds.  
B Judicial review 
56 Section 27(2) guarantees access to judicial review of 
determinations of tribunals and public authorities concerning 
rights, obligations and interests. 
27 Right to justice 
… 
(2) Every person whose rights, obligations, or 
interests protected or recognised by law have 
been affected by a determination of any tribunal 
or other public authority has the right to apply, in 
accordance with law, for judicial review of that 
determination. 
… 
57 The phrase ‘judicial review’ is not used in any technical 
sense,96 and the provision should be interpreted generously.97 
In Mangawhai Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association Inc v 
Kaipara District Council, 27(2) was described as protecting 
“access to justice”:98 
a person's access to the Courts to challenge the 
legality of public decision-making is a 
fundamental right designed to guard against the 
abuse of public power. 
                                                   
93 See Bryan Caplan and Edward P Stringham “Privatising the Adjudication 
of Disputes” (2008) 9 Theoretical Enquiries in Law 503 at 517; Peter B 
Rutledge Arbitration and the Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2013) at 151. But see discussion below at [179]. 
94 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1 art 36(3). 
95 Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman [2004] NZLR 95 (HC) at [50]. 
96 Burt v Govenor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA) at 679, per Cooke P. 
97 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA). 
98 Mangawhai Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association Inc v Kaipara 
District Council [2014] NZHC 1147 at [92]. 
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58 Others doubt that the right necessarily entails grounds for 
appeal.99 The provision has a wide effect, limiting the 
legislature’s ability to oust judicial review.100 The White Paper 
suggests that s 27(2) of the BORA “sets out and gives 
enhanced status to the basic constitutional right to go to court 
to challenge the legal validity of government actions.”101 
Similarly, it would serve as a check on privative clauses that 
purport to restrict judicial review.102 
59 The Draft BAT confines rights of judicial review in a manner 
identical to the limitations under the New York convention.103 
Accordingly, it coheres with the framework for review 
provided by the Arbitration Act 1996.104 
60 Broadly, the grounds of available review most relevant to the 
BAT are: lack of notice or lack of opportunity to present 
case;105 excess of jurisdiction;106 or that the dispute is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration or enforcement of the 
award would be contrary to public policy.107 
61 While the New York Convention does not go so far as to define 
public policy reasons for denying enforcement of an award, the 
Arbitration Act 1996 clarifies the term (though does not limit 
it). An award is contrary to public policy where:108  
(a) the making of the award was induced or 
affected by fraud or corruption; or  
(b) a breach of the rules of natural justice 
occurred— 
(i) during the arbitral proceedings; or 
                                                   
99 Butler and Butler, above n 79, at [25.3.14]. Appeal and review may, 
though, be distinguished: Joseph, above n 51, at [22.2.3] 
100 See Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 690 (CA), where 
the Court found that review had not been inferentially ousted. See Butler 
and Butler, above n 79, at [25.3.20]. 
101 Palmer “A White Paper”, above n 89, at [10.127]. 
102 At [10.127]. 
103 Compare Draft BAT, art 7 and Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 330 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 
10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959), art V. 
104 See above at [27]-[28]. 
105 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1 art 36(1)(a)(ii). 
106 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1 art 36(1)(a)(iii). 
107 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1 art 36(1)(b). 
108 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1 art 36(3). 
20 
 
(ii) in connection with the making of the 
award. 
62 While this codification is relatively unusual,109 a similar narrow 
approach to the interpretation of the public policy exception is 
preponderant internationally.110  An award will be reviewable 
for being contrary to public policy for the purposes of art 
34(2)(b)(ii) of sch 1 of the Arbitration Act if “it was so flawed 
that its enforcement would bring into question the integrity of 
the Court’s processes and powers.”111 It requires that a 
procedural irregularity likely resulted in a substantial 
miscarriage of justice, which in turn requires that the 
complained of finding be central to the reasoning of the 
award.112  
63 The scope for review is narrower, then, than that available in 
respect of appeals on the decisions of State courts where 
ordinarily the decision of a court of first instance may be 
appealed. Likewise it is narrower than the review available for 
the decisions of domestic administrative tribunals.113 
64 For instance, grounds for review have been confined to exclude 
the possibility of review of whether there was any evidence to 
support a factual finding by an arbitrator by the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in.114 Such decisions indicates a broader 
policy of deference to arbitral tribunals to support the policy of 
the Arbitration Act 1996, that being the finality of arbitration 
awards and limited judicial intervention.115 As Dobson J 
observed in Petroleum Mining Co Ltd v Shell (Petroleum 
Mining) Co, the powers of the court are limited to a:116 
confined supervisory jurisdiction where the 
Arbitration Act 1996 … is premised on the basis 
that for those who elect by contract to resolve 
                                                   
109 Other countries with similar elaborations are Scotland, Singapore and 
Australia: Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, at 488. 
110 Gary Born International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer 
International Law, The Netherlands, 2012) at 401-3. Williams and Kawharu, 
above n 13, at 762. 
111 Williams and Kawharu, above n 13, 123. 
112 At 124. 
113 See generally Joseph, above n 51, at [22.8.5]. 
114 Gold and Resource Developments (NZ) Ltd v Doug Hood Ltd [2000] 3 
NZLR 318 (CA) at [55]. 
115  At [55]. 
116 Todd Petroleum Mining Co Ltd v Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co Ltd HC 
Wellington CIV-2008-485-2816, 17 July 2009 at [24].  
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their differences by arbitration and where they 
thereafter do so, then the autonomy of that 
process is to be respected and there are only 
narrowly confined circumstances in which the 
court can intervene. 
65 Such limited grounds for review infringe the guarantee under s 
27(2). Perhaps the rationale for confined grounds of review is 
consistent with the White Paper’s conception of the scope of 
the guarantee, viz.— that it would “permit only the regulation 
of the right [but] not … authorise its denial.”117 The right to 
access review is regulated to deliver the policy end of efficient 
dispute resolution.  
66 The objective of finality of decision-making, a central 
advantage of international commercial arbitration,118 would be 
compromised by grounds of review exceeding the established 
parameters of the New York convention. Such is the tension of 
the BAT: expanding the grounds for review because of 
potential concerns raised by this paper risks reducing the 
purported economic benfits of the BAT, because one of the key 
benefits of arbitration is finality at the expense of review.  
C Conclusion 
67 I refrain from a s 5 analysis of the justifiability of these 
limitations.119 So far as the BAT might entail prima facie 
infringement of rights protected by the BORA, such 
infringements likely amount to a justifiable limitation on the 
relevant rights. Indeed, it has been argued that the BAT 
improves the right to access justice by giving parties access to 
effective justice, rather than limiting that right.120 It is arguable 
that arbitral tribunals meet the natural justice standards 
required by the BORA.121 As regards the right to review of 
decisions, it has been noted that the White Paper indicated that 
the right could be regulated. Given awards a reviewable on 
some grounds, the right can hardly be said to be denied.  
                                                   
117 Palmer “A White Paper”, above n 89, at [10.175]. The White Paper is at 
times unclear, however, as to whether descriptions of the intended effect of 
the guarantee were matters of scope, or of justification. See generally Butler 
and Butler, above n 79, at ch 6. 
118 Born, above n 110, at 13. 
119 See instead Butler and Herbert, above n 6, (forthcoming).  
120 Petra Butler and Herbert, above n 6, (forthcoming).  
121 But see discussion below at [179]. 
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68 Nonetheless, the BORA is not the full measure of the New 
Zealand constitution—it focusses on an important, but not 
comprehensive matter, that being the relationship between the 
State and the individual. In the following parts, this paper looks 
to the broader questions of constitutionality: those concerning 
the effect of the BAT on the relationship between branches of 
government. The BAT might be a justifiable limitation on 
individual rights under the BORA, but may nonetheless be an 
unjustifiable interference with New Zealand’s constitutional 
settlement. These matters are what Joseph describes as 
questions of “institutional morality … the moral dimension of 
public power [which describe] the correct organisation of the 
State.”122 
69 For instance, the White Paper suggests that s 27(2) of the 
BORA “sets out and gives enhanced status to the basic 
constitutional right to go to court to challenge the legal validity 
of government actions.”123 It reflects the importance of the 
constitutional principle of the rule of law which of course 
preceded the enactment of the BORA. Similarly, s 27(2) is to 
serve as a check on privative clauses that purport to restrict 
judicial review124—an end that preserves the separation of 
powers. The principles that underlie the relevant BORA 
provisions are then expressly of a constitutional character. 
Accordingly, the BORA marks the legislative endorsement of 
the principles that will be addressed in the next Parts.  
V The separation of powers 
70 The separation of powers, even if not perfectly realised,125 is a 
central constitutional principle of Westminster parliamentary 
democracies.126 The principle requires that the entities 
exercising legislative, executive and judicial functions should 
                                                   
122 Joseph, above n 51, at 2. 
123 Palmer “A White Paper”, above n 89, at [10.127]. 
124 At [10.127]. 
125 The separation can be said to be imperfect because of the degree of 
fusion of the executive and legislative branches, and the administrative 
power the executive has in relation to the judiciary.  
126 Roger Masterman The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary 
Constitution: Judicial Competence and Independence in the United 
Kingdom (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) at 227; Ministry 
of Justice Annual Report 1 July 2010 – 30 June 2011 
<www.justice.govt.nz> at 3; Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at [4.12]. 
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be independent of one another. The rationale for the division is 
that power divided is power less dangerous.127  
71 In constitutions that derive from Westminster, the tripartite 
separation of powers, first described by Montesquieu in De 
l'esprit des loix in 1748, is “an evolved division.” 128 As a 
result, the division is less clear than that in countries with a 
written constitution that clearly delineates the branches of 
government.129  
72 If not written, the lines of separation nonetheless exist. And in 
any case, even without legal effect, the principle has the 
normative implication that, having separated the functions of 
State, they ought remain separate.130 Contemporary statements 
indicate not only that the judiciary is its own branch of 
government, but that its constitutional role is not a product of 
actions by the other branches of government:131  
It is not a creation of Parliament. It is not and 
cannot be a creature of the executive. 
73 In relation to the judicial function, the separation of powers is 
given substance in part through the principle of judicial 
independence.132 The constitution guarantees judicial 
independence and protect the judiciary from legislative or 
executive usurpation of its powers.133 It is questions of that 
nature that provide the most heat (and the least light) in modern 
debates about the constitutional status of the judiciary.134 But 
the BAT presents a different concern. Instead of risking the 
subordination of the judiciary to, say, the executive, the BAT 
would represent an effort on part of the executive and 
legislature to bypass the courts, because parties would by 
                                                   
127 Geoffrey Palmer “The Legal Framework of the Constitution” in Colin 
James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 2000) 182 at 185. 
128 Priestley, above n 57, at 3. 
129 Consider Article III of the Constitution of the United States of America, 
which reads: “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court…”. 
130 Joseph, above n 51, at 199. 
131 Priestley, above n 57, at 3. 
132 See United Kingdom Select Committee on the Constitution Relations 
between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (HL) (2006–07) HL 
151 at [27]. 
133 Joseph, above n 51, at 199. 
134 See, generally, Priestley, above n 57. 
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default be subject to the authority of arbitrators and not the 
State courts. 
74 This raises three main concerns. The first is that access to State 
courts may, as Elias CJ, extra-judicially, suggested, fall into 
“the basket of fundamental rights”—rights not of a statutory 
character, but of the common law.135  
75 Second, from an instrumental perspective, the policy might 
weaken the judiciary such that it is less effective at performing 
other functions which are undoubtedly constitutional in nature. 
For instance, it is said that “the separation of powers is crucial 
in guaranteeing the integrity of the courts’ performance of 
[judicial review]”.136  
76 Finally, and the focus of this part, it may not be constitutional 
to substantially curtail the powers of one of the three necessary 
branches of government. Just as it would be inappropriate for 
the courts to usurp the powers of Parliament, it would be 
inappropriate for the Parliament to remove the powers of the 
courts. The essential question is this: how far can the 
legislature go in disestablishing the courts’ jurisdiction? 
77 This part will deal only with the second of those three 
arguments. The justification for access to State courts as a 
constitutional right is made below in Parts VII and VIII. 
Matters of judicial review and institutional capacity are dealt 
with in relation to the rule of law, below and Part VI. 
A Judicial power under written constitutions 
78 Before looking to the judicial power under Westminster 
constitutions, it will be useful to look at conceptions of judicial 
power in the United States, with particular reference to 
arbitration, because it brings into sharp relief the notion of a 
judicial power. 
79 Article III of the US Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial 
power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
                                                   
135 Sian Elias “Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-
Go-Round” (address to conference on Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 
Institute for Comparative and International Law, University of Melbourne, 
March 2003) at 21, citing Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation 
Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 
136 Bingham, above n 74, at 78. 
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Court…”. In CFTC v Schor137 the Supreme Court of the United 
States identified both a personal right conferred by Art III and a 
non-waivable component, the latter of which can only be 
overcome by way of a multi-factor balancing test.138 Rutledge 
is, by contrast, of the view that there is no personal right 
emerging from Article III; instead it is a matter of conferring 
the judicial power of the US.139 This disagreement over the 
character of the provision is illustrative of the idea of the court 
as a constitutional actor with a right to persist, independent of 
questions of individual rights of access; that is, it is a matter of 
institutional morality.140 
80 Enforceability of arbitral awards is the consequence of judicial 
policy, but also that of the executive and legislature insofar as 
each have entered into international agreements or legislated to 
facilitate the enforcement of awards. Rutledge observes that 
separation of powers principles “generally prohibit the 
commandeering of another branch of government”.141 
Arbitration then “diminishes the power of the judicial branch 
… [by] stripping federal courts of the power to interpret the 
meaning of federal law and erecting a system by which 
others—namely arbitrators—can define it.”142 Arbitration has 
the effect of undermining the power of the judicial branch to 
varying degrees, depending on the extent to which it is 
supervised by the judicial branch. 
81 In the same way that administrative tribunals are a common 
feature in New Zealand, there is “too much precedential water 
under the bridge” to pursue a literalist attitude to Article III. 
Congress has not infrequently foreclosed Art III judicial review 
with administrative agencies and the courts have tolerated its 
efforts.143 Nonetheless, separation of powers issues are more 
acute in arbitration because the arbitrators are explicitly 
determining matters of law on a much broader scale than 
administrative tribunals, which are often confined to particular 
areas of law and are superintended by the courts.  
                                                   
137 CFTC v Schor (1986) 478 US 883. 
138 Rutledge, above n 93, at 18. 
139 At 19.  
140 See discussion above at [68]. 
141 Rutledge, above n 93, at 23.  
142 At 22.  
143 At 24. 
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82 To remedy these separation of powers concerns, Rutledge 
prefers what he terms a modified form of “appellate review 
theory”, drawing on the work of Richard Fallon.144 The 
constitutionality of non-Article III tribunals can be preserved 
by adequately searching review of the relevant decision.145 
Fallon concluded that in respect of matters of constitutional 
law, it was necessary for courts to have an opportunity for de 
novo review of arbitral awards for a scheme of arbitration to be 
constitutional.146 
83 Relevant to the BAT, he considers that consent is a relevant 
factor in that it can amount to a waiver of the Article III rights: 
“when both parties are satisfied that the adjudicatory systems 
treats them fairly, there is substantial assurance that the agency 
is not generally behaving arbitrarily or offending separation-of-
powers values.”147 But, even then, consent does not ameliorate 
separation-of-powers concerns.148 Consent to a system 
indicates that the parties are not concerned about separation of 
powers matters, but there may exist nonetheless in terms of 
constitutional significance insofar as it implicates third party 
interests, such as in the application of securities law. “In a truly 
involuntary arbitration, such as the BIT arbitrations”, Rutledge 
argues that “the fairness concerns remain dominant and, thus, 
so too does the need for Article III review.”149 
84 Rutledge concludes that, though close, private commercial 
arbitration is constitutional under the modified appellate review 
theory. The lack of review of factual errors does not present 
Article III concerns, as many non-judicial adjudicators are free 
to determine factual matters without supervision of the 
courts.150 Regarding matters of constitutional law, the scope of 
review available under the FAA and the NYC is sufficient,151 
but only so far as the doctrine of manifest disregard survives, 
                                                   
144 Richard H Fallon “Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and 
Article III” (1988) 101 Harv L Rev 915. 
145 Rutledge, above n 93, at 27. 
146 Fallon, above n 144, at 976. 
147 At 991-2. 
148 Rutledge, above n 93, at 31. 
149 At 37. 
150 At 46.  
151 At 46-7.  
27 
 
which is uncertain following Hall Street Associates.152 This is 
the case due to the voluntariness of arbitration which allows for 
a reduced role for federal courts.153 For instance, he considers a 
scheme that entirely forecloses review of the decision of an 
arbitrator’s decisions, even in cases of manifest disregard of the 
law, to be unconstitutional for infringing on the separation of 
powers.154   
85 The US commentary indicates that, in a jurisdiction with a 
clearly demarcated judicial power, there is a feat that 
arbitration raises constitutional concerns that can only be 
resolved by sufficient involvement of the courts. But that 
conclusion survives in part because, unlike under BAT 
arbitration, the parties have expressly consented to arbitration. 
B Judicial power in Westminster constitutions 
86 The High Court exercises powers emergent from the common 
law and equity, and has inherent jurisdiction.155 The inherent 
jurisdiction it exercises is that developed by the Royal Courts 
of justice “from medieval times, which included the 
jurisdiction to superintend inferior courts and tribunals.”156  
87 Section 16 of the Judicature Act 1908, a part of New Zealand’s 
constitution,157  reads: 
The court shall continue to have all the 
jurisdiction which it had on the coming into 
operation of this Act and all judicial jurisdiction 
which may be necessary to administer the laws of 
New Zealand. 
88 In this Part reference will therefore be made to the 
constitutional status of the courts of the United Kingdom, 
                                                   
152 Hall Street Associates LLC v Mattel Inc (2008) 552 US 576. Rutledge, 
above n 93, at 48-9.  
153 At 47. 
154 At 48. 
155 Joseph, above n 51, at [21.5.3]; Anthony H Angelo Constitutional Law in 
New Zealand (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2011) at [226]. 
156 Joseph, above n 51, at [22.3.6]. 
157 Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act: Towards a Consolidated 
Courts Act (NZLC IP29, 2012) at [1.1]. 
28 
 
because the New Zealand courts stem from the same sovereign 
authority—their jurisdiction has been continued.158  
89 The preservation of the role of the courts, and their inherent 
jurisdiction is a complicated matter. The Law Commission, in 
its recent review of the Judicature Act 1908 suggested a unitary 
courts act that would organise the judiciary in one statute. 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s proposal of using the 
language of ‘continuation’ in statutory reference to the 
jurisdiction of the High Court, the judges were concerned about 
the possibility of the constitutional status of the judiciary being 
diminished.159  
90 The submission of the Law Society captures the perspective 
well. It argued that reforms ought to:160 
preserve fundamental features of our constitution. 
... One such feature is that Superior Court judges 
– that is, Her Majesty’s judges signified by the 
Judicature Act hold a constitutional office. 
Together, such judges constitute the judicial 
branch of government. The organisation of the 
Superior Courts appellate structures has, of 
course, been accomplished by legislation, but the 
foundation from which all proceeds is the 
inherent jurisdiction of a judge to deal with all 
justiciable issues. This is the basis of judicial 
review, for example. Judicial powers can, of 
course, be augmented and regulated in various 
ways, and in particular contexts, by Parliamentary 
enactments. But the origin of those powers lies 
with the judicial power of the Sovereign, 
recognised since the early 17th century to be 
exercisable only through the Sovereigns judges. 
... [It is therefore] important that the detail of any 
reforming legislation be carefully considered so 
that it preserves the continuity of these 
constitutional arrangements – just as the 
Constitution Act itself did for the law making 
powers of Parliament. 
91 The High Court then undoubtedly occupies a unique 
constitutional position.161 It has been described as bearing 
                                                   
158 The Judicature Act 1908 uses the language of continuation. The 
legislation prior to that Act vested the New Zealand courts with the 
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sovereign power. It exercises sovereign authority in concert 
with Parliament. So Sedley writes that:162  
It is in Parliament and the courts, each exercising 
a discrete though interdependent function of the 
State, the legislative and the judicial, that the 
sovereignties of the State reside. 
92 The rule of law, said Lord Bridge in X Ltd, “rests upon twin 
foundations: the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament in 
making law and the sovereignty of the Queen’s courts in 
interpreting and applying the law.”163 In Tangiora v Wellington 
District Legal Services Committee, the Privy Council used 
similar language of sovereignty. Referring to the bodies listed 
as judical authority in the Legal Services Act 1991 the 
Committee said:164 
Every such body forms part of the legal system of 
New Zealand in that it exercises the adjudicative 
functions of New Zealand. The jurisdiction of 
such a body is coercive, not consensual. It 
exercises in the name of the State the sovereign 
adjudicative power of the State. 
93 And in Arbitrators Institute of New Zealand Inc v Legal 
Services Board  Heron J described judicial power as:165 
the power which a sovereign authority necessarily 
has to determine disputes between its subjects, or 
between itself and its subjects. 
94 Sovereign authority is of the common law. The modern 
common law, suggested Lord Cooke, contains two unalterable 
principles: “the operation of a democratic legislature and the 
operation of independent courts.”166  
95 While not so clearly established as that in the United States, it 
appears then that under the New Zealand constitution sovereign 
authority is exercised by the courts and the Parliament in 
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concert, albeit the respective judicial and legislative functions. 
In the author’s view, this reflects the settled “institutional 
morality” of the New Zealand constitution—it is a matter of the 
correct allocation of State authority.  The State must see that it 
provides a venue for the exercise of that power. Accordingly, 
Lord Diplock described access to the courts as a constitutional 
principle:167a 
Every civilised system of government requires 
that the State should make available to all its 
citizens a means for the just and peaceful 
settlement of disputes between them as to their 
respective legal rights. The means provided are 
courts of justice to which every citizen has a 
constitutional right of access in the role of 
plaintiff to obtain the remedy to which he claims 
to be entitled in consequence of an alleged breach 
of his legal or equitable rights by some other 
citizen, the defendant. 
96 The foregoing gave a general overview of some conceptions of 
the role of the courts in the New Zealand constitution, and 
underscored the importance of the separation of powers as a 
matter of institutional morality. To alter the jurisdiction of the 
courts is to alter the authority of one part of the sovereign.  
97 An examination of the jurisprudence and commentary 
concerning ouster (or “privative”) clauses will be useful for an 
assessment of the separation of powers implications of the 
BAT. Ouster clauses are legislative provisions that purport to 
exclude the jurisdiction of a court to deal with a matter that 
would otherwise be within its jurisdiction.168  
98 The effect of the ouster clause is generally to attempt to vest 
conclusive jurisdiction over a dispute in a non-judicial body, 
often an executive administrative agency, or a tribunal of sorts 
that sits outside the ordinary judicial hierarchy. By way of 
analogy, the effect of the BAT would be to vest adjudicative 
power, subject to very minimal supervision by the courts, in 
what might otherwise fairly be described as a private tribunal.  
99 We have already seen, in relation to the US Constitution, the 
clear articulation of a judicial power. Westminster constitutions 
                                                   
167 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau Und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping 
Corporation Ltd [1981] AC 909 (HL) at 977. 
168 Edlin, above n 49, at 70. 
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have no written component that so expressly establishes or 
demarcates judicial power. The controversy over ouster clauses 
is, in the author’s view, provides the most vivid expression of 
the judicial power as being beyond the reach of the other 
organs of State. The constitutional propriety of ouster clauses 
can, then, be used a yardstick for the similar assessments as 
regards the BAT. 
100 Privative clauses are a challenge to judicial autonomy,169 and to 
the separation of powers. Accordingly, attempts by the 
legislature to confine the jurisdiction of the courts to review 
State action is a threat to the “institutional position and 
constitutional obligation” of the courts.170 The right of access 
to the courts need not be considered, as it may traditionally be 
approached,171 as a matter of an individual right, but rather as 
an issue of the relationship between courts and the other 
branches of government as institutions; the relationship 
between the constituent organs of State:172 
Rather than conceive of the right of access to the 
courts in terms of what is logistically necessary 
for purposes of litigation (from the litigant's 
perspective), [the analysis can be reconfigured] in 
terms of what is constitutionally necessary for 
purposes of adjudication (from the common law’s 
perspective). 
101 The Court of Appeal in NZ Drivers’ Association stated that 
there is a “traditional reluctance, based on fundamental 
constitutional principles, to allow the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary Courts to be taken away”.173 And it boldly went 
further to say:174  
we have reservations as to the extent to which in 
New Zealand even an Act of Parliament can take 
away the rights of citizens to resort to the 
                                                   
169 Edlin, above n 49, at 70. 
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ordinary Courts of law for the determination of 
their rights. 
102 Discussing the principles underlying that decision, Lord Cooke 
observed:175 
the existence and functioning of independent 
Courts [is a fundamental premise]. … If an Act 
were to provide that the superior and other Courts 
should cease to hear cases … and thereafter all 
indictments, informations, suits, actions or other 
justiciable proceedings or issues whatsoever 
should be determined within a hierarchy of 
administrative tribunals, with members holding 
office at the Pleasure of a Minister, it could 
hardly stand… The Courts have a constitutional 
role and it is their duty to fulfil it. … Of course 
that does not prevent restructuring of the Court 
system. For instance, In New Zealand by an Act 
of 1987 a Labour Court has been created… It has 
taken over, to the exclusion of the High Court but 
subject to rights of appeal to the Court of Appeal, 
jurisdiction over (inter alia) tort and inducement 
of breach of contract actions connected with 
strikes or lockouts, including the power to grant 
injunctions. Its Judges hold office during the 
traditional “good behaviour”, subject to removal 
by Her Majesty upon address of the House of 
Representatives. There appears to be nothing 
constitutionally objectionable in these provisions. 
What would be constitutionally objectionable, I 
suggest, would be to try to transfer the essentially 
judicial part of the work to a body that is not a 
Court in the same sense. 
103 The approach of both United States and English courts to 
ouster clauses reveals important features, suggests Edlin, of 
the:176  
subtle underlying dynamics of institutional 
relationship and to examine shared commitments 
to judicial independence and to a correlative right 
to seek review of governmental action in and 
through the judiciary. Reading these cases 
together, I argue that this right should be 
conceived in the United States as it is articulated 
in England: a fundamental right of access to the 
courts. 
104 The importance of review has led to a the courts resisting 
privative clauses. It is insufficient that the provision indicate 
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that the decision of the tribunal is to be “final”.177 Parliament 
must expressly legislate to the effect that it intends to deprive 
citizens of access to the courts.178 The courts will take a 
restrictive approach, requiring “clear statutory wording” to oust 
the High Court’s jurisdiction.179 Nonetheless, Tipping J 
observed in O’Regan that it was “perfectly possible” for 
Parliament to render the determinations of a decision-maker 
absolutely conclusive.180 
105 The general refusal to abide ouster clauses suggests, however, a 
stronger principle at play.181 This attitude has a substantial 
vintage.182 In Young v Police, Randerson J suggested that, 
while Parliament may regulate review by way of statute so far 
as is consistent with the BORA, there may be limits to its 
powers in this respect that emerge from the constitution. 
Thus:183 
The Judges of the High Court retain the inherent 
jurisdiction to modify the grounds of judicial 
review at common law as they have done 
traditionally for many years. Parliament may also 
modify the statutes conferring powers of judicial 
review, but only within the constitutional 
constraints of s 27(2) and s 5 of the Bill of Rights 
Act, as well as constitutional law generally. 
106 The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing material is that 
there is a strong constitutional principle that tells against 
diminishing the jurisdiction, and with it the power, of the 
courts.  
C Effect of BAT on judicial power 
107 This section examines the effect of the BAT on the judicial 
power and concludes that it would grant sovereign authority to 
arbitral tribunals to the exclusion of the courts from their 
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traditional domain.  Ordinarily, the power of the arbitrator to 
decide the dispute was understood to arise from the private, 
consensual, agreement between the parties.184 Though there is 
statutory control of arbitration, it remains essentially 
contractual.185 If, even then, the arbitrator is “quasi-judicial” in 
nature,186 under the BAT arbitration, the arbitrator will be 
much closer to exercising actual judicial function. In Tangiora 
v Wellington District Legal Service Committee,187 the Privy 
Council observed that a:  
… private arbitrator, whose authority derived 
from the consent of the parties and not from the 
State, was not a “judicial authority”… 
108 But in Arbitrators' Institute of New Zealand Inc v Legal 
Services Board Heron J expressed the view that:188 
There may be … situations where an arbitrator is 
acting on authority of the Court or the State and 
may, depending on the circumstances, be an 
"administrative tribunal or judicial authority". 
109 It is the view of the author, then, that the BAT tribunals would 
be in effect exercising the sovereign authority of the New 
Zealand courts while being outside of that system. Their 
judicial authority would flow, though, not from the continuing 
jurisdiction of the courts based on their position as a 
constitutional actor, but because the purported power was 
granted to them by the legislative and executive branches.  
110 While it is perfectly constitutional to permit private parties to 
establish by consent the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and 
accordingly proscribe in various ways the authority of the 
courts to supervise the arbitral proceedings, where the 
jurisdiction flows from an exercise of State power, the courts’ 
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jurisdiction may not be so confined without injury to the 
constitution. As Lord Diplock observed:189 
it was held by the Divisional Court that the 
general supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court 
over the proceedings of inferior courts and 
tribunals extended only to "bodies on whom 
Parliament has conferred statutory powers and 
duties which, when exercised, may lead to the 
detriment of subjects who may have to submit to 
their jurisdiction." These bodies would include 
arbitrators appointed to conduct a statutory 
arbitration to whose jurisdiction parties to a 
particular kind of dispute are compelled to refer it 
for determination, but they do not include 
arbitrators appointed pursuant to private 
arbitration agreement. In relation to private 
arbitrations the jurisdiction of the High Court to 
supervise the conduct of the arbitration is 
confined to exercising the powers conferred upon 
it by the Arbitration Acts 1950 and 1979 (though 
the latter Act does not apply to the arbitration in 
the instant case). The reason for this distinction is 
that the jurisdiction of an inferior court or 
statutory tribunal or arbitrator over the person 
who wishes to resist the claim is compulsory 
whereas the jurisdiction of an arbitrator over both 
parties to a private arbitration agreement is 
consensual only. 
111 Accordingly, there is a distinction between arbitral tribunals 
(based on consent) and inferior courts generally. In the context 
of consensual arbitration, the approach of most jurisdictions, 
including New Zealand, is to take a restrictive approach to the 
grounds available for the setting aside of an award or the 
refusal of its enforcement. This is a sensible approach—
consent is a sound proxy for fairness as assessed by the 
parties.190  
112 In absence of that fundamental marker of consent, the process 
is no longer arbitration and one of the core rationales for 
judicial restraint is absent. The tribunal is exercising authority 
conferred on it by Parliament, and not by the parties 
themselves.  
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113 The courts, faced with awards made under BAT arbitration, 
might be more willing to make interventions for several 
reasons. First, rather than jurisdiction by contract, the BAT 
tribunal derives its authority from the State. It is a fundamental 
function of the courts of justice to supervise the exercise of 
power by other branches of government. Indeed, the Law 
Commission in its report on arbitration recognised that, 
generally, “the State should … impose on parties to disputes 
arising under statutes, as the means of resolving those disputes, 
only official bodies such as courts and statutory tribunals.”191 
114 Many non-judicial bodies exercise adjudicative functions in 
New Zealand, such as the Tenancy Tribunal, the Social 
Security Commission, and the Taxation Review Authority.192 
The divide between courts of judicature and administrative 
tribunals is, however, not very clear.193 The labelling of a body 
as a court or a tribunal is not conclusive.194 The courts will 
without express permission exercise the inherent jurisdiction to 
supervise inferior tribunals. In Attorney-General v Reid the Full 
Court of the High Court held that:195  
normally when an inferior Court exceeds 
jurisdiction the issue will be brought before this 
Court by way of review or by way of 
extraordinary remedy and that this Court 
exercises its general supervisory jurisdiction even 
if there is no right of appeal in respect of the 
inferior Court. 
115 Perhaps, then, a more intense species of review would be used 
in relation to BAT awards than is used in respect of arbitration 
awards generally. The language of the Arbitration Act 1996 
does not conclusively define “public policy”, leaving scope for 
greater judicial intervention. This would be redolent of 
Rutledge’s approach—the “modified appellate review 
theory”.196 This would sit well with the conclusion that 
Parliament has authority to divest the courts of jurisdiction,197 
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while guarding against the risks of the BAT that raise 
constitution questions in the first place.  
116 Or in the alternative, the courts might react more strongly. Lord 
Steyn suggested that there might exist “exceptional 
circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review 
or the ordinary role of the courts [where a court] may have to 
consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which 
even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a 
complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.”198 
117 That would be, according to Edlin, loyalty to the 
constitution:199  
The recognition and enforcement of [the right to 
judicial review] by English and United States 
courts, even against legislative attempts to 
preclude their jurisdiction, represents the 
preservation of the judiciary's traditional role and 
responsibility rather than defiance toward the 
legislature. 
118 In any case, the strength of the presumption against ouster 
clauses—the requirement of clear language, and the reticence 
of the courts to acquiesce even in the face of such language—
suggests that what is at stake is a constitutional principle. 
Whatever the courts’ response to the BAT might be, the 
‘ought’ of the constitution might demand that we think 
carefully before pursuing such a policy. 
D Summary  
119 Separation of powers arguments have little force in relation to 
delegating adjudicative functions to administrative tribunals 
provided that they act in accordance with principles of natural 
justice and are amenable to supervision by the courts.200 The 
BAT tribunals would operate according to the principles of 
natural justice,201 but are only subject to review on 
exceptionally narrow grounds.  
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120 Even those that argue from the ideal of the separation of 
powers often return to an instrumentalist justification: whether 
the presence of the courts promotes the accountability of the 
other branches of government. Accordingly, if orthodox 
arguments from the separation of powers are unpersuasive, the 
same concerns can be rephrased in a more instrumentalist 
manner as rule of law concerns. The separation is a key 
constitutional principle as it is “a necessary condition of the 
rule of law and limited government.”202 It is closely related 
with the maintenance of the rule of law, the implications of 
which are addressed in the next Part.  
VI The rule of law 
121 Arguments from the rule of law are challenging. The meaning 
of the term is amorphous, and there are many competing 
definitions. Palmer opines that a definition that “has broad 
enough support and agreement that we can use it effectively in 
law” is difficult to pin down.203  
122 It is though, a central principle of Westminster constitutions. In 
R v Jackson the House of Lords described it as the ultimate 
controlling factor on which our constitution is based.”204 
Despite its vagueness, there is statutory recognition of the rule 
of law in New Zealand in the form of s 2 of the Supreme Court 
Act 2003, which reads: 
Nothing in this Act affects New Zealand's 
continuing commitment to the rule of law and the 
sovereignty of Parliament. 
123 This section will draw out several articulations of the rule of 
law that are relevant to the operation of the BAT.  
124 Tamanaha famously identified three clusters of concepts 
recurrent in various expositions of the rule of law: (i) 
government limited by law, (ii) formal legality, and (iii) rule of 
                                                   
202 Joseph, above n 51, at 226. 
203 Matthew Palmer “Assessing the Strength of the Rule of Law in New 
Zealand” (paper presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law 
Conference on “Unearthing New Zealand’s Constitutional Traditions”, 
August 2013) at 2.  
204 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 at 
[107], per Lord Hope. 
39 
 
law not man.205 Waldron describes the central plank as the 
principle that:206 
people in positions of authority should exercise 
their power within a constraining framework of 
public norms rather than on the basis of their own 
preferences, their own ideology, or their own 
individual sense of right and wrong.  
125 From these conceptions I suggest the principles relevant to 
assessing the BAT are, first, that government limited by law 
requires that exercise of State authority be subject to control by 
another, independent, State authority, such as courts. Second, 
for there to be rule of law, that is publically promulgated norms 
of general application, it is necessary that the role of 
interpreting the law be reserved to a State authority other than 
that which produces the law. That latter role should be 
performed in a public manner by one organ of State. So far as it 
is tolerable to devolve interpretation, as in, say, the case of 
administrative tribunals, it is necessary that the ordinary 
interpretative authority—that is, the courts—be able to correct 
and control the actions of devolved interpreters.  
126 Such is necessary for the fulfilment of Dicey’s proviso that 
government action be subject to the general law.207 And so 
Bingham observed of the mother Westminster constitution that 
the rule of law requires that:208 
all persons and authorities within the State, 
whether public or private, should be bound by 
and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and 
prospectively promulgated and publicly 
administered in the courts. 
127 The essential argument of this Part is that the jurisdiction of 
State courts to superintend the conduct of public bodies and 
inferior tribunals (including BAT tribunals) is essential to 
maintaining the constitutional principle that such entities must 
act in accordance with the law; or, in other words, that the rule 
of law is to be maintained.209  
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128 So far as the BAT places the sovereign power to use coercive 
State force, and the power to interpret the law, in an arbitral 
tribunal it undermines the rule of law, unless it allows for the 
interpretative authority of the State to supervise the exercise of 
those powers. Because the BAT provides for only 
exceptionally limited grounds of review, this paper concludes 
that it is not consistent with the rule of law.  
129 The subsequent sections examine the rule of law in terms of 
two fundamental threads: (A) the interpretative role of the 
courts, (B) the review role of the courts. Thereafter will be an 
assessment of the role of (C) voluntariness in justifying 
departures from the rule of law, and (D) an exploration of some 
possible constitutional limitations on attempts to subvert the 
rule of law. 
A Preserving the interpretative role 
130 The court, being the primary law-applying institution in the 
New Zealand legal system, has reserved to it the power to 
identify what the law is.210 In relation to the determinations of 
administrative agencies, upholding the rule of law requires that 
the meaning of a statute is “always a question of law for the 
courts.”211 The courts have a constitutional obligation to rule 
on questions of law, though that role may be constrained by 
statute.212 Removing that function to BAT tribunals without 
significant oversight from the courts is an infringement of that 
principle. 
131 In a way, this argument is a restatement of the principle of the 
separation of powers, or at least a justification of the separation 
of powers on the grounds of the rule of law. Indeed, it is said 
that the rule of law “entails a separation of powers; the 
independence of the judiciary from the executive and 
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legislature.”213 It would be contrary to the rule of law, then, for 
the executive and legislative branches to establish an 
essentially compulsory jurisdiction alternative to that of the 
courts, as it usurps the courts’ interpretative role. 
132 Dworkin argues that the rule of law:214 
insists that force not be used or withheld, no 
matter how useful that would be to ends in view, 
nor matter how beneficial or noble these ends, 
except as licences or required by individual rights 
and responsibilities flowing from past political 
decisions about when collective force is justified. 
133 A part of that political decision-making process is the 
interpretative role of the courts. It is the place of the courts to 
“make authoritative declarations of what the law is, which 
obligations must be performed and which responsibilities must 
be discharged.”215 That requires, the author suggests, a singular 
judiciary, rather than multiple jurisdictions.  
134 Encouraging otherwise similar dispute to be heard in different 
tribunals subverts the rule of law by undermining the unified 
application of the substantive law. Speaking of administrative 
tribunals generally, or “specialist courts”, Heydon criticises 
modern neglect of Dicey’s concern that law be applied by 
unitary rules in general courts. Heydon’s general complaint is 
that the isolation from the general body of law results in 
departures from the “general standards of the ordinary 
courts”.216 But there are also concerns about the way that 
arbitral tribunals may apply substantive law in a manner 
different to that of State courts, and/or differently to other 
arbitral tribunals.  
135 Varying application of substantive law is contrary to the rule of 
law, as in effect, those wielding authority are not acting 
according to the norms that were available to the public prior to 
the decision being made.217 Publically promulgated rules are 
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necessary for the rule of law, as without them individuals 
would not be able to determine what behaviour is lawful.218 
136 Regardless of judgments as to the ability of arbitrators, the 
differing institutional structures of arbitral tribunals and State 
courts by itself encourages divergent application of substantive 
law. BAT tribunals, not subject to review on matters of law and 
generally more limited in their access to precedent for want of 
public decisions, are more likely to depart from uniform 
application of the law.219 Consistent application of substantive 
law is both essential to the rule of law as a matter of principle, 
but also necessary for creating the conditions in which the rule 
of law flourishes—a context where there is public trust in the 
system of adjudication. Fairness and consistency increase 
“public trust in the system of justice will be enhanced, thereby 
serving [the] public good.”220  
137 Admittedly, arbitrators may have the advantage of subject-
matter expertise in relation to international commercial 
disputes.221 That might improve consistencey, and promote the 
rule of law. But, because the BAT process is private and 
confidential, it will be difficult to validate those claims. 
138 Moreover, as Rutledge observes, “arbitrators can be arbitrary”, 
in that they have a financial incentive to adopt expansive 
jurisdiction, may be captured by powerful entities insofar as 
they desire further business from a party that is more likely to 
seek arbitration services in the future.222 That effect is not 
necessarily confined to voluntary arbitrations—simply because 
a party is subject to BAT arbitration does not mean that in 
other disputes they may be a potential future customer for an 
arbitrator’s services.  
139 The argument above is that creating a jurisdiction alternative to 
that of the State courts is contrary to the rule of law because it 
usurps the courts’ constitutional role as interpreters of the law. 
But in New Zealand there are many administrative tribunals 
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that undertake interpretative functions. Certainly efficiency 
requires placing these functions in bodies other than the courts 
on occasion. In the next section, this paper addresses the role of 
review in remedying rule of law concerns arising from the 
exercise of these powers by non-judicial bodies. 
B Review of government action 
140 The BAT substantially confines the review of decisions made 
by tribunals constituted under it. It is this feature that gives rise 
to many of the rule of law concerns. Tamanaha suggests that 
the formal legality element of the rule of law entails “a rule-
bound order established and maintained by government.”223 
This requires that the exercise of government authority by one 
branch is subject to review and control for rule of law 
compliance by another branch of government—the courts.224 
Part of a rule-bound order is ensuring that the rules are actually 
rules—i.e. that they are of general application, applied 
similarly to similar situations.225  
141 In the current constitutional order, the rule of law is maintained 
by the general availability of review. Most exercise of 
government authority is reviewable—over time the bounds of 
justiciability have expanded as commitment to rule of law has 
strengthened.226 This principle finds formal expression in s 27 
of the BORA.227 Indeed, that provision necessarily includes the 
exercise of authority by the courts. The fact that review of 
decisions of the Courts are not themselves subject to review is 
a prima facie infringement of that right, and permissible for the 
reason that it is a justifiable limitation on the right.228  
142 One reason that such is justifiable is that there is a formal 
structure of appeal that generally allows a party two or more 
appeals after an initial determination.229 The suggestion that the 
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lack of review is nonetheless an infringement of s 27 of the 
BORA speaks to the strength of the principle. Applying the 
same standard, BAT tribunals ought to be subject to an 
intensity of review concomitant to the power they would 
exercise. But they would not be.  
143 An example of prior legislative interference with the 
jurisdiction of the courts will be useful for understanding the 
importance of review. In 1972 New Zealand largely abolished 
recourse to civil law for personal injury, in a policy decision 
that confined the jurisdiction of the courts, but also 
demonstrated a willingness to substitute administrative 
processes for judicial processes.230 The subsequent 
establishment of various “a-legal” administrative processes that 
assume roles that perhaps would otherwise be filled by the 
courts indicates, Palmer suggests, a limited degree of respect 
for the courts on part of law-reformers.231 If, as this paper 
argues, the BAT is a threat to the separation of powers and the 
rule of law, was not also the establishment of the accident 
compensation scheme? Certainly, the effect was to strip the 
courts of a large part of their civil jurisdiction, much as the 
BAT would do.  
144 The first distinction is that the authority for determining 
matters that were the province of the courts is a domestic, State 
authority. It is, accordingly, much closer to the levers of 
democratic accountability than an off-shore, private institution 
that operates under conditions of privacy and confidentiality. 
So far as the separation of powers concerns tend to blend with 
rule of law issues, the public nature of the authority might limit 
the risks of judicial function being assumed by a creation of the 
executive.  
145 The second distinction is that, unlike other bodies that have 
judicial functions by dint of legislative or executive action, the 
BAT tribunals would not be subject to review in the same 
manner. New Zealand administrative law demands public 
authorities confine themselves to their jurisdiction,232 for the 
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reason that, were an authority free to exceed its granted 
jurisdiction “without any check by the Courts, the rule of law 
would be at an end.”233  
146 The doctrine of competence-competence permits the arbitrator 
to determine their own jurisdiction.234 This policy finds 
expression in the subsequent application of a presumption that 
arbitrators are within jurisdiction for the purposes of 
enforcement of awards.235 Courts have been restrained rather 
than proactive in refusing to enforce awards on grounds of 
excess of jurisdiction.236 The end result is that BAT tribunals 
could exceed jurisdiction in a way that would be considered a 
violation of the rule of law if it were to be done by an 
administrative tribunal.  
147 If the present approach of respecting jurisdictional 
determinations of arbitrators were to be carried over writ large 
into the implementation of the BAT, the rule of law would be 
at risk. A non-State institution would be exercising powers of 
coercion and interpretation of the law that are properly reserved 
to the judiciary. That is permissible so far as the judiciary may 
superintend the exercise of those powers. The confined review 
jurisdiction is inconsistent with that end, and is accordingly 
contrary to the rule of law.  
C Voluntariness and the rule of law 
148 Some of these rule of law concerns exist also in voluntary 
arbitration. This section argues that, while it is tolerable to 
suffer departures from the rule of law where one consents to 
the same, it is unacceptable in the case of the compulsory 
jurisdiction established by the BAT. It should be kept in mind 
that “the law of arbitration is written on the basis that the 
parties have consented to that method of decision-making.”237 
If the rule of law concerns this paper raises can be dismissed in 
relation to voluntary arbitration, they cannot in circumstances 
where the jurisdiction is compulsory.  
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149 One of the significant benefits of the rule of law is the growth 
of commerce, and the subsequent improvements to human 
welfare. In this vein, Rivkin argued that by holding commercial 
parties to their agreements, arbitrators have created “creating 
predictability and certainty, [and] they have enabled 
international commerce.”238 Arbitration in general could be 
said to improved adherence to the rule of law. Rivkin’s 
conception of the rule of law tolerates a departure from the 
above descriptions of the rule of law which require the 
government action to be subject to checks and balances. Those 
elements of the rule of law are less important where the 
arbitration is voluntary, because voluntariness is, generally, “a 
proxy for fairness”.239 We would not expect parties to opt in to 
a process that was unfair. But they might opt into a process that 
was contrary to the rule of law in a global sense, provided that 
in the local sense—in the world of their dispute—it was 
suitably efficient or otherwise desirable. 
150 We tolerate the divergences from the rule of law in consensual 
arbitration because inter alia the power exercised by the 
arbitrator arises from the consent of the parties, and the 
acquiescence of the State to that preference.240 Tamanaha 
indeed suggests that arbitration generally is a departure from 
formal legality conceptions of the rule of law Uniform 
application of a set of rules have an “all-or-nothing 
consequence, resulting in winners and losers”, whereas some 
relationships, such as commercial ones,  “are often better 
served by both sides going away from a dispute satisfied.”241 
151 But the conditions this departure from an orthodox application 
of rule of law principles to all circumstances with the 
observation that the parties’ primary concern in some 
circumstances is “to come to a mutually acceptable 
resolution.”242 That might require opting out of the national 
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courts. But we know that the outcome better serves their 
interests because they have voluntarily chosen the process.  
152 So far as an institution has powers that are supported by 
coercive force, it is essential that that institution be subject to 
the rule of law, so as to protect the dignity of those living 
within under that institution.243 More specifically, the rule of 
law is a principle regulating the use of coercive force—it is a 
“prescription for government”.244 So far as a BAT tribunal 
possess coercive power, it ought to be subject to the rule of 
law.  
D Constitutional consequences 
153 The rule of law entails a reciprocal obligation among the arms 
of government to not impose upon the legitimate functions of 
one another. A proceduralist approach to the rule of law 
identifies institutional integrity as being essential to the rule of 
law, and that it is violated where the institutions that uphold 
procedural protections are “interfered with”.245 Elias CJ 
expressed this principle in relation to the courts’ obligations to 
the other branches:  
The courts are themselves subject to the rule of 
law and accordingly cannot usurp powers 
lawfully exercised by other agencies, including 
Parliament.246 
154 Similarly, the rule of law could be said to preclude Parliament 
and the executive from pursuing policies that undermine the 
powers of the courts. A removal of access to the courts might 
amount to an affront the rule of law requiring judicial 
intervention.247 The courts, being a reactionary rather than 
proactive institution,248 are fundamentally reliant on their 
inherent jurisdiction in order to exercise their constitutional 
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function. To confine the reach of the jurisdiction is to 
undermine the judiciary’s power.  
155 The Diceyan conception of Westminster constitutions 
considers the central tenet of the rule of law to be the ability of 
the law to control the actions of government officials.249 We 
can conceive of the existence and autonomy of the judiciary as 
being essential to Tamanaha’s first theme of the rule of law: 
that of setting limitations on government. “[T]he essential 
prerequisite” of the maintenance of the rule of law “is that the 
judiciary must possess a degree of independence from the rest 
of the governmental apparatus.”250 So far as the legislative and 
executive branches are able to excise portions of the courts’ 
jurisdiction, that threshold is crossed, even if the matter does 
not directly pertain to an action of the government. But in any 
case, the actions of BAT tribunals would be an exercise of 
State power.251 
156 The rule of law may therefore limit the powers of the executive 
and legislature to fundamentally adjust the jurisdiction of the 
courts. Joseph describes the rule of law provision in the 
Supreme Court Act 2003 as internalising an “unresolved 
tension”, because it simultaneously expresses commitment to 
the rule of law and to Parliamentary sovereignty—concepts 
which pull in opposite directions.252 Because the rule of law is 
an a priori concept—that is, one that precedes or is “anterior 
to” the positive laws made by the State—Joseph claims that the 
statute establishing the Supreme Court could not change the 
fundamentals of the constitution.253  
157 If the rule of law is accepted as a precondition of Parliament’s 
law-making powers, it might be beyond the authority of 
Parliament to implement the BAT. This conception of law-
making authority is similar to that expressed by the Chief 
Justice, where she described:254  
a more modest principle of legislative primacy 
under which the legislation of Parliament prevails 
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over the decisions of the courts or of subordinate 
lawmakers unless contrary to the constitutional 
rules upon which law-making validity depends. 
158 It is not clear that the BAT would be seen as sufficient 
infringement upon the rule of law and access to the courts that 
the courts would exercise a potential “in extremis power” to 
disapply legislation.255 It is not as though the BAT would 
disestablish the courts.  
159 But in any case the question is pertinent. Judicial independence 
and the role of law are maintained not simply through de jure 
institutional arrangements, but the de facto attitudes of other 
branches of government towards the judiciary, particularly the 
view “that it is improper to meddle with the judiciary as it 
fulfils its role interpreting and applying the law.”256 
Accordingly, the implication of this section can be phrased as a 
normative call to the legislative and executive organs of State 
to not act to curtail the courts’ jurisdiction. 
VII Privatisation of State function 
160 Some State functions, such as the allocation of punishment, are 
arguably a non-delegable function of the State.257 This 
argument relies once more on particular conceptions of the 
nature of the State, described above in the terms of institutional 
morality. The argument of this part is that there is a limit on the 
extent to which the State may abandon powers that are 
justifiable only because they are exercised by the State, rather 
than other entities.  
161 The judiciary is, the author suggests, one of those central 
functions. Lord Bingham observed, while attempting to 
articulate the content of the rule of law, that “the provision of 
courts as one of the essential functions of a liberal democratic 
State.”258  
                                                   
255 Concerning the potential power, see Joseph, above n 51, at [7.3.2]. 
256 Tamanaha, above n 205, at 124. 
257 See, concerning the prison system, Jane Maltby “The Role of the State in 
Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights in Privately Managed Prisons” 
(LLB (Hons) Research Essay, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) at 7-
9. 
258 Bingham, above n 74, at 78. 
50 
 
162 Many States have, however, in recent decades “embraced such 
private dispute resolution models as appropriate for a wide 
array of conflicts.”259 The emergence of arbitration and 
alternative dispute resolution more generally has challenged the 
role of the courts as the sole venue for the determination of 
rights and obligations. This trend forms a part of a larger 
change in approach to governance, that being “the privatisation 
of public processes, the diminution of transparency, and the 
decline of regulation.”260  
163 Genn argues that the trend in privatisation is part of a broader 
process of reconceptualising government functions as services, 
rather than necessary functions. In relation to the judiciary, 
once it “is packaged as a public service as opposed to an arm of 
government it becomes necessary for it to justify its claim to 
resources.”261 This transition is part of a broader discourse in 
which civil justice is “locate[d] … as a private matter rather 
than a public and socially important good.”262  
164 The trend toward privatisation risks the institutional capacity of 
the courts. Sufficient resources are necessary for the judicial to 
continue to discharge its broader constitutional function of 
providing a check on the actions of government. 
165 In a similar vein, a reason for retaining cases in State courts is 
that cases build judicial capacity in the form of the experience 
of the judges. The more commercial disputes that are 
adjudicated before New Zealand courts, the better the ability of 
the judiciary to effectively adjudicate them. The first benefit of 
this is that such capacity is important for domestic commercial 
relations. Similar issues present themselves in international 
commercial disputes and domestic commercial disputes, and 
the adjudication of the former increases the quality of the 
adjudication of the latter. There is a desirable cross-
subsidisation of commercial dispute resolution when cases that 
would otherwise be diverted by the BAT are kept in New 
Zealand courts.  
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166 As regards the efficacy of arbitration, it cannot flourish without 
strong State courts, both as guides for the inevitable 
interpretation of matters of domestic law, and as assistants in 
the task of effective arbitration—enforceable interim measures 
and a judiciary willing to enforce arbitral awards is essential to 
functioning arbitration.263 
167 Moreover, the judiciary provides a public good. The law 
promulgated by the judiciary allows for the functioning of inter 
alia economic relations without the need to formally adjudicate 
each possible dispute. Disputes are often resolved in the 
shadow of the law. But for “civil justice to perform its public 
role—to cast its shadow—adjudication and public 
promulgation of decisions are critical.”264 That is a public good 
because it is non-rivalrous, in that consumption of the law does 
not exhaust the resource, and it can be consumed without 
paying for its production or access to it. Accordingly, we can 
expect a private market to underprovide it.265 
168 A final line of argument against the privatisation of the judicial 
function is based on the justification for coercive force. This 
form of argumentation has been used in the criticism of the 
privatisation of prisons. Medina describes the reasoning 
thus:266 
a private entity employing governmental powers 
poses an un- avoidable risk of an unjustified use 
of force. According to this view, the very 
“culture” of for-profit organizations creates a risk 
of an abuse of power. 
169 These arguments have more rhetorical force in the case of 
prisoners because of their vulnerability. The reasoning sits less 
well with regard to commercial parties which do not experience 
the power imbalances that prisoners do. 
                                                   
263 See generally Jan Paulsson “Why Good Arbitration Cannot Compensate 
for Bad Courts” (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration 345.  
264 Genn, above n 9, at 21. 
265 Genn, above n 9, at 47, n 28. The obvious caveat in relation to law is 
that, while publically available, it generally requires the purchase of 
professional services to access it.  
266 Barak Medina “Constitutional limits to privatization: The Israeli 
Supreme Court decision to invalidate prison privatization” (2010) 8 Int Jnl 
of Constitutional Law 690 at 691. 
52 
 
170 The arguments against the BAT on the grounds that it is a 
privatisation of an essential State function are not, in the 
author’s view, dispositive. Each largely turns on empirical 
assumptions about the magnitude of the effect of the BAT 
which are difficult to determine ex ante. These are more useful 
then as part of a holistic assessment of the constitutionality of 
the BAT. 
VIII Open justice and democracy 
171 This Part addresses the impact of the BAT on the constitutional 
norms of open justice and democracy. They are grouped 
together here, because they are both, the author suggests, 
norms of accountability. For intstance, the House of 
Representatives must generally conduct its business in public 
for the reason that the public must be privy to its activities in 
order to hold it accountable. Similar though not identical 
principles apply to adjudication.267  
A Openness and accountability 
172 It has long been recognised that administering justice in public 
is a part of a Westminster constitution and was described in 
1913 as “a sound and very sacred part of the constitution of the 
country and the administration of justice.”268 It is a principle of 
“ancient vintage” that appears in a range of constitutional and 
human rights documents internationally,269 and has been 
described as a fundamental constitutional principle in New 
Zealand.270 Jeremy Bentham said of publicity that publicity:271 
is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to 
exertion, and the surest of all guards against 
improbity. It keeps the judge himself, while 
trying, under trial. 
                                                   
267 Joseph Jaconelli Open Justice: A Critique of the Public Trial (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002) at 2.  
268 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 473 per Lord Shaw. 
269 Jaconelli, above n 267, at 5. 
270 Joseph, above n 51, at [15.7.3]. 
 271 Jeremy Bentham Benthamiana or Select Extracts from the Works of 
Jeremy Bentham (1843) at 115, cited in New Zealand Law Commission 
Improving the Arbitration Act 1996 (NZLC R83, 2003) at [76]. 
53 
 
173 Admittedly, the principle of open justice generally gives way to 
the principle of party autonomy in respect of arbitration.272 
Even then, the Law Commission observed that arbitrations 
where a State-owned enterprise was a party and matters of 
public concern were at issue ought to be public, as well as 
“information derived from an arbitration which is relevant to 
the regulatory functions of the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange”.273 Privacy and confidentiality in arbitration are not, 
then, absolute rights of the parties. In any case, the rationale for 
that departure stems from the consent of the parties, which is 
absent in the case of BAT arbitration.  
174 The cornerstones of democratic systems are participation of 
those governed, and the accountability of those who govern.274 
The exercise of coercive State force is justifiable so far as those 
subject to it are involved in deciding the grounds on which it is 
exercised. When members of the public find State actions, 
including judicial decisions, contrary to their values, a system 
of democratic participation allows them to hold institutions 
accountable.275 This principle of accountability is bound up 
with the rule of law. Thus Waldron observes that participation 
is important to the maintenance of the rule of law:276 
Instead of the certainty that makes private 
freedom possible, the procedural aspects of the 
rule of law … value opportunities for active 
engagement in the administration of public 
affairs.  
175 The judiciary, though not immediately electorally accountable, 
are a part of the fabric of representative democracy. Judges, 
even when appointed, are selected for their conformity with 
views of the community. They do not live in isolation from the 
views of the community at large, and their work is subject to 
sometimes strident public criticism which cannot but influence 
their decision-making.277  
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176 Accordingly, the judiciary and the other branches are “partners 
in the common endeavour of representative government.”278 In 
the case of court, in absence of elections to office, the princpal 
means of accountability is through public access to proceedings 
and reasons.279 The three purposes for giving reasons have 
been identified by the Court of Appeal as being (i) openness in 
the administration of justice,   (ii) permitting decision-makers 
charged with reviewing a decision to understand the reasons, 
and (iii) that it is a form of discipline that is “the best protection 
against wrong or arbitrary decisions and inconsistent delivery 
of justice.”280 Further, publicity of adjudication ensures that 
legislatures can “monitor the enforcement of public law and 
amend legislation when judicial decisions go awry.”281 The end 
of all of those is the promotion of accountability.  
177 But the private and confidential nature of BAT arbitration 
severs the public from the institution. Passing off a substantial 
volume of the decision-making to private institutions is prima 
facie inconsistent with the democratic justification for the 
authority of the decision-maker to interpret and apply the law. 
Arbitration diminishes public participation in the 
administration of justice.282  
Unlike State courts which, except in unusual circumstances,283 
are open to the public and publish their reasoning, arbitral 
tribunals generally sit in private and their decisions are subject 
to confidentiality obligations. Therefore “arbitration tends to be 
undemocratic, especially when compelled,”284 because it 
decreases public participation in the adjudicative process. The 
tribunal is required, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, to 
State the reasons for its decision.285 But some courts have 
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enforced awards that lacked reasons even where that lack was 
contrary to both the arbitration agreement and the procedural 
law of the arbitration.286 The reasons will in any case likely be 
confidential,287 and so unable to fulfil the function of 
accountability.  
178 Arbitral tribunals also lack accountability because 
opportunities for review of decisions are more 
circumscribed,288 and the public, including the press, the 
public’s main proxy for judicial accountability, does not have 
access to the arbitral tribunal’s hearings, or their decisions.  
179 By contrast, Caplan argues that private arbitral institutions 
operate in a competitive environment and, unlike monopolistic 
State courts, will accordingly be more accountable to their 
‘customers’ than State courts.289 Arbitral institutions are a 
dispute resolution product which must compete on inter alia the 
degree of fairness that they provide by way of process 
protocols. The problem for the BAT is that it preselects an 
institution, removing the element of competition.290 
Nonetheless, the appointing authority remains a participant in 
the market of voluntary arbitration and we can expect 
competitive pressures to persist. In any case, public 
accountability is distinct principle to that of natural justice, the 
main target of Caplan’s economic reasoning. Accountability is 
a duty owed to the public, not the parties to the dispute. We 
cannot expect parties to pay premiums for the diffuse benefit of 
public accountability, and the argument for leaving the matter 
to the market is, then, less persuasive. 
180 The overarching concern is that these strands of accountability 
are necessary for the legitimacy of the existing constitutional 
order. And it is important that they exist visibly. Interpretation 
of law, and particularly constitutional law, turns in part on how 
something looks. Accordingly, the Law Commission observed 
that “many legal principles rest on a justification that 
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appearance can be as important as substance.”291 A recent 
development in public concern about adjudicative processes is 
the extent to which the body of adjudicators are representative 
of the plurality of their communities.292 Proportional 
representation is an important factor in the democratic 
legitimacy of the judiciary.293 It is unlikely, in the author’s 
view, that the arbitrators appointed by the Permanent Court 
will achieve this democractic objective.  
181 More than simply needing to be done, must be manifestly seen 
to be done.294 In this vein, Reuben argues that:295 
Courts and the law provide for the legitimacy of 
the political, economic and social order by 
assuring legal constraints, compliance and 
stability. This social capital is substantial, but is 
still capable of diminishment.  
182 That social capital is at risk if the structures of accountability 
that constrain and make justifiable the exercise of State power 
are undermined. That is the negative argument from open 
justice. The next section formulates the argument from open 
justice in the positive sense: there is much to be gained from 
public adjudication. 
B Public interest in particular laws 
183 Decreasing the number of cases that are heard before the courts 
risks undermining the courts’ role of sovereign interpreting the 
law.296 Similarly, it prevents courts from fulfilling their 
institutional responsibility to develop the law. The first concern 
historically gave rise to questions of arbitrability, and has 
waned as arbitration has become more commonplace. The 
                                                   
291 Law Commission, above n 159, at [1.16]. 
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second concern, by contrast, has become more acute with the 
proliferation of arbitration.  
184 Historically, the “arbitrability” of certain areas of law that 
engage the interests of third parties (the public, for instance) 
that are not party to the arbitration agreement has been 
contentious.297 In the United States, the judicial approach in 
recent years has expanded the number of public law matters 
that can be subject to arbitration, including, for instance, anti-
trust legislation (or, competition law).298 This trend is present 
in the limited New Zealand case law on the matter.299 
185 Legislation such as the Commerce Act 1986 contains important 
public policy, the enforcement of which is for the benefit of the 
public.300 That legislation could be relevant to an international 
commercial dispute.301 The public is not, though, ever party to 
the arbitration of international commercial disputes. Where the 
law is misapplied or ignored by a BAT tribunal, the public may 
suffer, and, as explored above, suffer all the more for the lack 
of accountability. 
186 Secondly in terms of public interest in particular law, the 
production of precedent is a public good.302 Arbitral tribunals 
may be less capable at developing the law than State courts for 
the reason that awards are seldom published and proceedings 
are held in private. Identical disputes can, then, be resolved in 
materially different ways without any mechanism for 
correcting the divergent effect of the law. Moving more 
disputes to arbitration has the consequence, then, of stymying 
the development of the law.  
                                                   
297 Park, above n 4, at 211. 
298 Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc 473 US 614 
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Commerce Commission [2010] NZSC 38, [2010] 3 NZLR 300. 
302 See above at [167]. 
58 
 
187 This is of particular concern in areas of law that are still 
developing. In the context of insurance law arbitrations, 
Abraham and Montgomery argue that unique provisions in 
contracts may never fall to be interpreted by the courts, 
preventing the development of precedent.303 With emerging 
areas of regulation in international commercial relations such 
as attempts to control greenhouse gas emissions, it might be 
undesirable to discourage the development of public precedent 
on the proper interpretation of contracts operating in regulated 
contexts.  
188 These concerns cannot, however, be decisive in determining 
the constitutionality of the BAT. Because it is already 
considered permissible for parties to contract into arbitration, 
and because such contracts have the above described effect on 
the administration and development of the law, the effect of the 
BAT can only be a matter of degree. The decision in Attorney-
General v Mobil Oil NZ Ltd indicates that preservation of the 
arbitration agreement outweighs the importance of the courts 
managing the application of high-importance laws.304 The lack 
of consent in BAT arbitration may, however, lead to these 
questions being considered in a different light. The arguments 
remain, but are reduced the status of a cost to be weighed 
against the purported benefits of the BAT. 
C Autonomy 
189 Protecting the autonomy of persons, a core value of democratic 
communities, might require that the default position be State 
courts, and that arbitration can only proceed by express 
consent. Reuben makes this argument in the context of 
consumer arbitration in the US, on the grounds that arbitration 
is often unilaterally imposed.305 Resorting to general principles 
of contract law—a field of law deeply focussed on values of 
autonomy—it might be preferable to place the transaction cost 
of negotiating arbitration on the repeat player who desires to 
arbitrate, given that most parties will assume that the State 
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courts are the default option. Freedom of contract, Barnett 
contends, entails both:306  
both freedom to contract — the power to effect 
one's legal relations by consent —and freedom 
from contract — the immunity from having one's 
rights to resources transferred without one's 
consent. 
190 Certainly, when chosen by the parties, arbitration enhances 
democratic values, such as autonomy.307 But the BAT would be 
in effect creating a standard term for contracts of the relevant 
category. To the extent that that is inconsistent with the parties 
intent, they have gained rather than lost autonomy.308  
191 One of the juridical rationales for the freedom of contract is 
that generally speaking individuals and associations that they 
might freely form have a comparative advantage regarding 
“personal” and “local” knowledge over a central planning 
entity.309 The implication of this observation is that there 
should be a presumption in favour of allowing private 
agreements to produce and regulate relationships between 
individuals, or at least a facility of that kind. 
192 Some forms of standardised terms, such as those based upon 
custom, can be explained as implied-in-fact terms, in that some 
implied terms “properly understood as part of the ‘objective’ or 
‘public’ meaning” of a particular kind of agreement, and those 
terms implied by operation of statute or judicial precedent are 
generally the product of those customs.310  
193 But even ardent supporters of theories of fictionalised consent 
in relation to default rules temper the philosophical 
awkwardness of the approach by reference to common 
understandings in particular communities. Consent may be 
                                                   
306 Barnett, above n 14, at 828. Emphasis in original. 
307 Reuben, above n 248, at 295. See also, concerning libertarian and 
anarchist theories of legal pluralism, Bryan Caplan and Stringham, above n 
93, at 506-7. 
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manifested in silence in circumstances where parties had 
reason to know of the default rule that would be imposed.311  
194 Accordingly, “… when one-shot players are contracting with 
each other or with repeat players, the default rule should reflect 
… everyday common sense and the onus should fall upon the 
repeat player to contract around the rule.”312 This encourages 
the repeat player to educate others, and brings the subsequent 
contractual relationship hews closer to the subjective intentions 
of the parties.313  
195 So in a choice between the default rule that disputes be subject 
to the jurisdiction of State courts, and another, that disputes be 
subject to BAT arbitration, the choice ought comport with the 
common understanding of how disputes arising from the 
relationship are to be resolved. This might suggest that we 
prefer a default rule of State courts in order to maximise the 
autonomy of citizens. 
IX Conclusion 
196 It should be kept in mind that “the law of arbitration is written 
on the basis that the parties have consented to that method of 
decision-making.”314 Compulsory jurisdiction is a sovereign 
power which ought to only be exercised within a system that 
has developed to contain and moderate the use of that power. 
When viewed holistically, the effect of the BAT on the 
constitutional principles discussed in this paper is, in the 
author’s view, too great a modification to the existing 
constitutional order without better evidence that the policy 
would be effective.  
197 The law does not, however, exist to serve the law. The law 
exists to serve people. Constitutional principles are not to be 
preserved for their own sake. They are to be modified to meet 
the needs of the time. The adaptability of the unwritten 
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constitution facilitates such progress. Indeed, such reflects what 
Burke called “the genius of the Constitution”.315 
198 The BAT could be constitutionally permissible, then, in 
circumstances where the benefits were suitably clear, and the 
harms to the constitution were tempered by some modifications 
to the policy. Accordingly, the author suggests the following 
changes.  
199 First, the courts should be more willing to supervise BAT 
arbitrations than consensual arbitration. This will come at the 
expense of some of the efficiency gains of the BAT, but it is 
necessary to avoid too great an injury to the separation of 
powers the maintenance of the rule of law. Possible areas for 
expanded review would be a change of approach to the 
meaning of ‘public policy’ and non-arbitrability as grounds for 
refusing enforcement. Closer review on matters where the 
interests of the public at large are engaged would minimise 
constitutional concerns. Likewise, the courts might take a 
stronger approach to the matter of excess of jurisdiction. At the 
very least, the presumption that the arbitrator’s assessment of 
jurisdiction be undisturbed must be abandoned to protect the 
rule of law.  
200 Second, BAT arbitrations should be held in public unless the 
parties agree to the contrary. There exists provision for private 
hearings already, both in State courts and arbitral tribunals. But 
the transaction cost of making hearings private should fall on 
those who desire privacy, rather than on those who desire 
publicity, given the broad public interest in open justice.  
201 Third, the tribunals should either publish reasons for their 
decision, or there should be established some mechanism for 
the publication of digests of decisions, or anonymised 
decisions. The availability of decisions would allow a larger 
measure of accountability, and the eventual empircal 
assessment of the success of the policy. It would therefore 
temper some of the rule of law and open justice concerns.  
202 These concerns raised in this paper may be less rhetorically 
pressing given that the subject matter is international 
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commercial disputes. Indeed, Sternlight makes light of the 
public interest elements of such disputes, observing that 
constitutional concerns are amplified:316 
when the subjects handled in arbitration affect 
public interests. That is, we care more when 
federal statutory claims such as employment 
discrimination are taken away from the public eye 
than when a dispute over the quality of soybeans 
shipped from Missouri to Nevada is handled 
privately. 
203 But the magnitude of the effect of the BAT on the arrangement 
of the civil justice system and the constitutional order demands 
close attention, even if it at first seems simply a question of 
efficiency. The risk of these policies is that, as Elias CJ 
observed in the abstract, “laws and practices may chip away at 
both access to the courts and their independence without any 
conscious design.”317 Such a modification to the constitutional 
arrangement requires careful consideration.  
                                                   
316 Sternlight, above n 220, at 1665. 
317 Elias, above n 50, at 8.  
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